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LAWYERS WITHOUT BORDERS 
CATHERINE A. ROGERS* 
1 .  INTRODUCTION 
Historically, attorney regulation presumed that lawvers 
practice i n  the delimited geographical jurisdiction where they are 
l icensed.1 Most lawyers were sole practitioners and, insofar as they 
exjstecl, Jaw firms were relatively intimate organizations of 
partners who all  knew each other and primarily serviced loca l 
clients on local matters in local courts.2 In recent years, this 
' Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State University, 
University Park, Pennsylvania & Universita Commerciale Luigi Bocconi, Milan, 
Italy and member of the American Society of International Law ("ASH.") Task 
Force on Global Professional Responsibility. I would like to thank the members of 
the ASIL Task Force, and particularly Detlev Vagts, for their contributions to my 
thinking on these topics. Of course, the views, and any accompanying errors, are 
mine alone. I am also grateful for the many ideas and insights I received from 
Jose Alvarez, Gary Born, Bill Dodge, Andy Kaufman, Claudia Krapf, Laurel Terry, 
Marco Ventoruzzo, Ted Schneyer, Bill Simon, David Wilkins, Stephen Wilske, and 
the many other global advocates who have been willing to share with n1e their 
experiences. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the University of 
Nevada at Las Vegas Law School, at the Globalization of the Legal Profession 
Symposium at Harvard Law School, and to the City Bar of New York Task Force 
on International Practice, where it benefitted from questions and comments of 
those present. Finally, I owe a debt to Jamie Coleman and Susham Modi for their 
excellent research assistance. 
1 See Charles W. Wolfram, Expanding State Jurisdiction to Regulate Out-of-State 
Lawyers, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1015 (2002) (arguing that lawyers are habitually 
divided into two groups: those who are locally licensed and therefore subject to 
regulatory power of the local bar, and those who are not). 
2 As Mary Daly explains: 
Until recently, lawyers infrequently practiced in more than one state. 
Law firms rarely established branch offices, with the possible exception 
of an office in Washington, D.C. or in a distant city to meet the particular 
needs of a single client. Consequently, in searching for ethical guidance, 
lawyers, courts, and disciplinary authorities looked only to the 
professional standards adopted by a single jurisdiction, the lawyer's state 
of general admission or the court to which the lawyer had been admitted 
pro hac vice. 
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localism has given vvay to global i sm.:; The figurcs rneasuring this 
transition arc stC1ggering. Prior to World VVar U, only four U.S. lav.' 
finns had <1n overseas office.-1 By 2004, the number had grown to 
381 foreign law offices i n  seventy-six cities in forty-eight different 
foreign countries . " Several other data points portray similarly 
dra1natic tales of international expm1sion,6 including gains for 
smaller and rncdiurn-size law firms in the globa l market for legal 
services.? Professional regulation of attorneys is still attem.pting to 
catch up with these demographic developments, most recently 
through revisions to Model �Rule 8.5 ('Rule SS' or the ''Rule"). 
The thesis of this Article is that, while Rule 8.5 i s  a meaningful 
Mary C Daly, Rc�oll'ing Etltiml Ccl/lfl;ct::. i11 Mulliiurisdicfionn/ Prnctice -·Is Model 
Rule 8.5 lite All�il't!r, 1111 An�wcr, w No Answer 111 All?, 36 S. TEX. L. RF.v. 715, 719 
(1995). For an insightful anulysis of how the term "partner" h<:1s become 
something of a misnomer ns U.S. law firms have erupted into large corporate-like 
structures thLlt sprawl across multiple jurisdictions, see David 13. Wilkins, Partner, 
Sltmnrtner! EEOC v. Sidley A�t>tin Brown & Wood, 120 HArW L REV. 1264 (2007). 
3 The intermediate slep between th.� local and the global is multi­
jurisdiction<Jl dom�stic prnctice and the rise of the national law firm. This Article 
does not direcllv uddress this phase, but several otheY scholars have documented 
this development and its significance for the legal profession. See gwemlly Gary 
A. MUJU1eke, Multljuri�clictinnn/ Prncticc v{ Law: Recent Development::; in t/rc Nntio11nl 
Dehnle, 27 j. LEGAL PRor. 91 (2003) (exploring developments in multi-jurisdictional 
practice and arguing that reform is essential); John F. Sutton, Jr., LlllaulhMizcd 
Practice of Lm:u by Lawyer�: A Ptl�/-Selllilltir Rejlectioll on "Ethics nud /he 
Mttltijuri::dictionnl PtncticL· ��fLaw," 36 S. Tsx. L. REv. 1027 (1995) (discussing 
unauthorized practice of law by out-of-state lawyers); Gerard J. Clark, The Two 
Fnces of Mu/ti-Jurisdictitlltnl Prnctice, 29 N. KY. L REV. 251, 273-77 (2002) 
(entertaining a proposal to eliminate restrictions on interstate practice). 
<� See Carole Silver, Wi!lners ll!ld Losers in tltc Gfobn/i:zatioll of Legnl Seruices: 
Situating tlze Mnrket for Foreign Lawyers, 45 VA.]. ll\.'T'L L. 897, 916-"17 (2005) (noting 
the growth of foreign offices backed by U.S. law firms). Notably, these statistics 
come from a study of only sixty firms1 so the overall number is probably higher. 
5 Jd. 
6 For example, as Laurel Terry notes, ''six of the world's ten highest-grossing 
law firms had more than 50% of their lawyers working in countries outside of the 
firm's home country." Laurel S. Terry, A "How Ttl'' Guide for Incorporating Globnl 
and Compnmtive Perspectives into the Required Professional Responsibility Course, 51 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1135, 1138 (2007) (quoting The Global 100, AM. LAW, Oct. 2006, at 
139). 
7 See Carole Silver, Regulatory NliSI/!lltch in !11e Market for Legnl Seruices, 23 Nw. 
J. TNT'I. L. & Bus. 487, 495 (2003) (''The international label is not claimed only by 
large law firms; even srnall Finns partiClpate in this specialty."). This 
phenomenon is a logical counterpart of the increased partidpation of smaller <md 
medium sized companies in the global economy. See Elena V. Helmer1 
l11temntiollal Com111crcinl Arbitration: Americn11ized, "Civili:ed," or Harmonized?, ] 9 
01-HO ST. ]. ON 0151'. RESOL. 33, 40 (2003) (noting the increase in the number of 
American IC�w firms that provide arbitration services). 
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attempt tL� respond lc) an obvious need, it ultimately causes rnore 
problems than it resolves and must be revised. 
The Americ<m Bar AssociC�tion fiTst sought to e1ddress 
attorneys' Jclivities outside the state i n  which they vvere licensed 
by promulgating Model Rule 8.5 i n  1983. 8 Originally, the Rule 
expressly dis<1vovvecl ''my ,lpplication to transnational (as 
distingu ished from i nterstate) activities. Instead, it left all 
questions 0bout conflicting ethical rules abroad to "agreements 
between jurisdictions or . . .  appropriate international lmv." The 
problem was thnt there were no such agreements or rules o£ 
international law, which meant international activities of U.S. 
attorneys, were v·irtuaJly unregulated.') 
In later versions, Rule 8..5's linlitation to interstate practice was 
abandoned and it was expressly extended to transnational 
activibes.l0 With respect to advocacy, which is the focus of this 
Article,ll the text of the Rule- now applicable to international 
practice- provides that "for conduct in connection with a matter 
pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction i n  which the 
tribunal sits [shall applyL w1less the rules of the tribunal provide 
otherwise . . . .  " 12 
:; As Me1ry Dalv has explained, Model Rule 8. 5 is not an ethical rule at all, but 
a choice of law rule. See Daly, Sll!lrn note 2, at 755 (noting that Model Rule 8. 5 is "a 
rule about choosing mles"). The Model Rules have been frequently amended 
sfnce the American Bar Associt'ltion adopted them in 1983, with the most recent 
amend.mcn t iJ1 2002. 
9 Advocates may still be subject to other iorms of regulation, such as criminal 
and civil sanctions, as well as oversight by other administrative agencies. for an 
extended discussion of the various mechanisms that regulate altomey conduct, see 
David B. Wilkins, Wllu Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. RF.v. 8 0 1  (1992). 
10 Specifically, Comment 7 provides "[tJhe choice oflaw provision [contained 
in Rule 8. 5] applies to lawyers engaged in transnational practice. " MODEL RULES 
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 8. 5 cmt. 7 (2002). 
11 Unless otherwise indicated, this Article considers only those aspects of 
Role 8. 5 that apply to advocates, meaning attorneys involved in dispute 
resolution activities. Other provisions of the Rule pertaining to advisory or 
transactional work have different choice of law provisions in Rule 8.5. See i1�{ra 
note 27, and e�ccompanying text. 
12 MODEl RULESOFPROF'L CONDUCT R 8.5(b)(1) (200 2). The full text of Rule 
8. 5 is as follows: 
(a) Disciplinary Authority. A lawyer admitted to practice in this 
jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, 
tegnrdless of where the lawyer>s conduct occurs. A lawyer not admitted 
in this jtu·isdiction is e1lso subject to the disciplinary authority of this 
iurisdictior\ if the I;C�wyer provides or offers to provide any legal services 
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Currently, eighteen states have adopted Rule 8.5, and another 
nineteen h<lve adopted similar rules.13 The Rule was adopted in 
response to a request by .internationJl attorneys for more guidance, 
and, for all i.ts flaws, it does bring a measure of certainty. For these 
reasons, it represents an important developrDent and a meaningful 
starting point in cross-border regulation of global advocates.14 At 
bottom, however, the Rule is a failed e, perimcnt as applied to 
international advocacy and it n1.ust be reconsidered. 
Rule 8.5's advocacy provts1ons were meant to provide 
guidance about vvhich rules to apply when U.S. attorneys are 
operating in foreign legal systems or before international tribunals. 
In these contexts, many e1spects of U.S. attorneys' conduct m.ay be 
considered unprofessional, unethical, or even illegal. For exan1ple, 
in nwst foreign and international tribunals, U.S.-style cross­
examination techniques and aggtcssivc litigation tactics are 
considered unprofessional at least, and sometimes overtly 
I d. 
in this jurisdiction. A lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority 
of both this jurisdiction and another jurisdiction for the same conduct. 
(b) Choice of Lnw. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this 
jurisdiction, tht· rules u[ professional conduct Lo be applied shall be as 
follows: 
(1) for conduct in connection with a n1attcr pending before a tribunal, the 
rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the 
tribunal provide otherwise; and 
(2) for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the 
lawyer's conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is 
in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to 
the conduct. A lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer's 
conduct conforms to the ru1es of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer 
reasonably believes the predominant effect of Lhe lawyer's conduct will 
occur. 
13 For a chart illustrating the implementation of Rule 8. 5, see Am. Bar Ass'n 
[ABA), State lmple111mtation of ABA Model Rule 8.5 (2009), available nt 
http:/ jwww.abanet.org/ cpr/ mjp/ quick-guide_8. 5.pdf. 
J4 The Council of Law and Bar Societies of Europe ("CCBE") Code of 
Conduct £or European Lawyers has identified the problem, but not offered any 
real guidance or solution, other than that attorneys inform themselves. Article 2.4 
of the CCBE Code pTovides: "When practising cross-border, a lawyer from 
anotl1er Member State may be bound to comply with the professional mles of the 
Host Member State. La...,vyers have a duty to inform themselves as to the rules 
which will affect them in the performance of any particular activity. " CCBE CODE 
Of CONOUCf FOR LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEA.;'J COMMUNITY art. 2 . 4 (2006). For a more 
comprehensive overview of recent developments in this mea, see Laurel S. Terry, 
U.S. Legal Ethics: Tl1e Collling of Age of Gtobnl nnrf Cvntpamfiz,e Perspecti'Ues, 4 WASH. 
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 463, 494 (2005) [hereinaJter Terry, U.S. Legal Ethics]. 
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unethical. Meanwhile, attorney advertising and contingency fees, 
both standard practices in the United States, are regarded as 
ethically contemptuous in most foreLgn legal systems. Tn some 
foreign countries, having a prive1tc individual or corn.pany serve 
process is downrigl1t i l l  ega 1, as is the hmdamental practice of 
preparing a vvitness for upcoming testimony. On lhe other hand, 
in conh·ast to their foreign counterparts, U.S. attorneys are 
generally bound by more extensive confidentiality obligations, by 
more restrictive notions of conflicts of interest, and by specific 
duties to report client perjury to a tribunal.1s With many of these 
examples, it would be clifficul t or impossible for an attorney to 
abide by both sets of rules, and RL1lc 8.5 was designed to provide 
clear guidance about which rules to follow. 
The problem, however, is that the current version of Rule 8.5 
does not resolve these conflicts. Perhaps even worse, when 
applied to international tribunals, the Rule alrnost ensures that U.S. 
altorneys will be abiding by etb.ical rules that are different from 
their opposing counsel's and that are utterly unrelated to the 
relevant tribunal or its procedures (unless the tribunal has adopted 
its own rules). One signal that Rule 8.5 misses its mark is that the 
outcomes it prescribes shocked pracbtioners who have appeared 
before the lran-U.S. Claims Tribunal or the International Court of 
Justice. Inforrnal survey research reveals that the attorneys had no 
idea that they were bound by Dutch ethical rules. The reason for 
this surprise, as discussed in more detail below, is that the physical 
location of these international tribun.aJs is largely unrelated to their 
purposes and procedures, or to the expectations of lawyers or 
presiding judges and arbitrators.16 
Ultimately, Rule 8.5' s shortcomj1 gs can be traced to its 
assun1ptions about territoriality and the historical relationship 
between the jurisdiction of tribunals and the licensir1.g of attorneys. 
These assu.mptions stem from the Rule's original focus on domestic 
attorneys in a federal systen1 who are l icensed in one jurisdiction 
and occasionally perform professional services in another sister 
state. International practice was added as something of an 
15 For an overview of these and other the ways that U.S. ethical obligations 
and procedural practices conflict with those of foreign systems, see Peter C. 
Kostanl, Snaed Cows or Cnsl! Co;us: The Abuse of Rhetoric i11 Justifying Some Cutte11t 
Norms of Trnnsnctional Lmoyeri11g, 36 WAKF. FOREST L. REv. 49 (2001); Catherine A. 
Rogers, Fit n11d Fu11cfion in Legal £thics: Developing a Code of Con duel for In ternaliuunl 
Arbitrntivn, 23 NIICH.]. J�r'L L. 3cJl (2002); Terry, U.S. Legnl Ethics, supra note 14. 
16 See inji·�1 notes 40--t7 <HHJ <!ccompanying text. 
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a fterthought, but apparently wi thout fully considering the 
important ways in which concep tions of jurisdiction and 
terri toriality differ in transnational,  as opposed to federal,  contexts. 
As I describe in Section 2, superimposing a federal rul e to the 
transnational system produces certain conceptua l and 
terminological problems that make it difficul t  to apply to global 
legal advoca tes. 
The5e probl e ms are exacerba ted when the Rule is  a p plied to 
pra.ctical situatior:s . In Section 3, I i l lustrate the problems caused 
by some of these applications . Finally, in Section 4, I make 
affirmative proposal s  for how to rectify some of the p robl ems that 
Rule 8.5 lea ves unresolved. To that end, I outline an approach to 
conflict-of-laws analysis tha t will  produce more satisfactory 
solutions. For international tribunals, I argue that nationa l  rules 
can never provide an a dequate substitute for tribunal-specific 
rules, and call on internationa l  tribunals to bet ter articulate and 
develop their own rules.  
Finally, with respect to enforcement, I argue for a coordinated 
approach that has licensing and regulatory authorities working 
with foreign and interna tional tribunals and regula tory authorities.  
In other areas of transnational regula tion- such a s  antitrust, 
securities, and corruption- international networks have d eveloped 
to promote transna tional regulatory governanceY In l arge part, 
these networks have been built by international lawyers operating 
in various capacities, such as government officials, j u d ges, NGO 
organizers, and client representatives. It is time now for them to 
turn similar efforts to their own self-regulation. 1s 
17 The seminal work on international networks is, of course, ANNE-MARJE 
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 20-21 (2004). 
18 Some efforts are underway: 
At the 2006 and 2007 ABA Annual Meetings, the E.U.-U.S. Legal Services 
Summits were co-hosted by the Council of the Bars and Law Societies of 
Europe (CCBE), and the Asia-U.S. Legal Services Sunu11its included 
lawyers and bar leaders from Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, 
Korea, Singapon:, and Vietnam. The ITILS Task Force also convened 
discussions with Latin Am.erican bar leaders at the Fall Meetings of the 
Section of International Law in Houston in 2005 and in Miami in 2006. 
The ITILS Task Force also communicates regularly with the International 
Bar Association (IBA), the Union Internationale des Avocats (UTA), the 
Law Society of England and Wales, and the Law Council of Australia to 
exchange information, coordinate initiatives, and discuss strategies. 
Laurel S. Terry et al . , Transnntiorwl Legal Pmctice, 42 1NT'L LAW. 833, 842 (2008). 
Many of these developments are being driven by concerns about regulation of 
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When U.S. authorities finally a ttenlpted to catch ethical 
regulation up with the g1obal activities of modern lawyers, they 
borrowed for the international arena a rule that was drafted for 
domestic multi-jurisdictional practice in a federc:d system. This 
Section reviews the textual and conceptual problems that result 
fron1 that extc11sion. 
2.1. Tile Drnflillg(�{Rule8.5 
f\s enacted in 1983, a quick read of Rule 8.5 n1 ight have 
suggested that it  dncs apply to U.S. lawyers practicing law ou tside 
the Unjted States. As noted above, the 1983 version of the Rule 
provided that " for conduct in connection with a matter before a 
tribunat the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits 
[shall apply], unless the rules of the tribunal provide 
otherwise ... . "1 9 ·n,e text1.1al breadth of the Rule was belied by a 
specific exclusion of international lawyers from the Rule. 
international l awyers themselves had vigorously fought for this 
exclusion.:w As a resul t  of their efforts, Comment 6 to the 1983 
version of the Rule disavowed any application to transnational or  
international legal practice1'1 and instead left any conflict-of-laws 
analysis to nonexistent /Jagrcements between jurisdictions or . . .  
appropriate internationallaw."22 
Some years later, U.S. l awyers engaged in. international practice 
apparently concluded that vagaries about which ethical rules apply 
legal services in international trade. See Laurel S. Terry, The GATS nnd Legal 
Services in Limerick, 15 MICH. ST. J, lNT'L L. 635 (2007) (addressing recent service­
related GATS developments). 
19 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCf R. 8.5 (1983). 
2o Tel'ty, U.S. legal Etllic:s, supra note 14, at 525 (2005). 
21 Comment 6 to the original version of the Rule, which provided that it was 
"not intended to apply to transnational practice/' was deleted in August 2002. See 
ABA, Ethics 2000 Commission Reporter's Explanation of Recommendation, 
Changes to the Rule, in ABA CENTER FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBIUTY, A LEGlSLATIYE 
HlSTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA M O DEL RULES OP PROFESSIONAL CONDUCf1 
1982-2005, 827, 831 (2006) [hereinafter Reporter1s £A-planation] (noting that the 
Commission m21de this modification because it "believe[d] that lavvyers enga,gecl 
in transnational practice ought to be governed by this Rule's choice of law 
provision"). 
22 See suprn nQte 9 and nccompcmying text. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
1042 U. Pa. f. Int'l L. [Vol .  30:4 
coul d  be more perilou s than liberating.23 Accordingly, in 2001, the 
International Law section of the ABA requested that Rule 8.5 be 
revised to provide greater choice-of-law guidance to transnational 
and international practitioners . 2-+ 
As a result the 2002 revisions deleted Com_ment 6 a n d  repbced 
it with the cu rrent Comment 7, which expressly rejected the 
exclu sion, providing instead that the "choice of law provision 
applies to l awyers enga ged in transnational practice ."2s The 
consequence of this change was to make Rule 8.5' s gen eral 
provision- that conduct by attorneys in connection with liti gation 
is governed by the " rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal 
sits" -applicable to activities by U.S. attorneys abroa d .  Sin1 i l ar to 
former Comment 6, the new Comment 7 makes reference to 
"international law, treaties or other agree1nents between competent 
regulatory authorities in the affected jurisdictions. "26 In contrast to 
the earlier Comment however, these international sources only 
become applicable if they produce a different result  than the basic 
choice-of-law provision of Rule 8.5. 
Another important change brought by the E thics 2000 
Commission is that the word " tribunal" replaced the earlier 
version's references to II  court ."  This change was made in 
recognition of II the increasing use of alternative dispute-resolution 
processes," and extended the Rule to " binding arbitration and 
other methods of formal ly  a djudicating the rights of parties . "27 As 
a result  of these changes, for those states that have adopted it, Rule 
8.5 now purports to provide choice-of-l aw guidance for U.S .  
attorneys who appear before foreign courts, interna tiona l  courts 
and tribunals, and international arbitral tribunals. 
As described in more detail below, the current version of Rule 
8.5 creates as many problems as it resolves.  These problems may 
have been foreshadowed by the drafting history of the provision, 
which does not reveal any express consideration of the unique 
complications involved 1n international and transnational 
23 See Terry, U.S. Legal E thics, supra note 14, at 525 (showing that lawyers are 
becoming increasingly sensitive to the comparative ethics issues, and possibly 
liability as well, through the ABA Section of International Law's urged reforms). 
24 Id. 
25 MODEL RULES OF PROF' L CONDUCT R. 8.5 cmt. 7 (2002). 
26 Id. 
27 Reporter's Explanation, s upra note 21, at 829-30. 
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c1dvocac�.r.2� More fundament<�lly, the current version of Rule 8.3 
proceeds from misconcept ions about the nature of international 
litigation and a rbitration, as well as the character and content of 
foreign cthic<1l regimes. These erroneous underpim1ings produce 
particularly anomalous results when app l ied to advocates ln 
interna tiomd practice. 
2.2. Spec ill! Pn.rui:;ions jc1r Adt.1ocntrs 
1n an �Kknowledgement that advocacy raises distinct issues 
frmn other t�'pes of legal represenlationl Rule 8.5 includes special 
prov isions for ad \'OG:ltes. Specifically, it provides that" for conduct 
in L'Onnect it'l ll  with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules [of 
profession<1l conduct] of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits 
[shall apply], un less the rules of the tribunal provide othervvise."2'.1 
Rule 8.5's prov isions regarding non-adjudicatory transnational 
activities admit that ''no sj ngle test ... can be applied to determine 
the appropria te choice-of-law rule in each case. 1 30 Accordingly, 
that part ot the Rule permits some flexibility for attorneys and 
disciplinary authorities to assess the appropriateness of ethical 
rules to particular conduct.:r1 Tn conh·astl the Rule's provisions for 
�� To be tair to the drafters of Rule 8.5, many of these problems are nol 
readily appc1rcnt even to international dispute resolution practitioners, and would 
be diffintlt to torecast without direct experience in the international proceedings. 
:!':! MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b)(1) (2002). Specifically, the 1993 
version provided that for conduct "in connection with a proceeding in a court 
before which ,, l.:lwyer has been admitted to practice . . . the rules to be applied 
shall be the rules of the jurisdiction in which the court sits, unless the rules of the 
court provide otherwise.'r MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 8.5(b)(1) (1993), 
nvailable af http:// www.law .cornell.edu/ ethics/ aba/2001/ ABA_ CODE. HTM 
#Rule_8.5. 
3ll ABA, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 397 (2000). Model Rule 8.S(b)(2) addresses transnational 
transactionRl and corporate practice, providing 
for any other conduct the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer's 
concf ucl occt.�rredJ or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a 
different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shaJl be app lied to the 
conduct. A lawyer shall not be subject to discipHne if the lawyer's 
conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer 
reasonably beLieves the predominant effect of the lawyer's conduct will 
occur. 
MODELRuu:.•;QF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5(b)(2) (2002). 
31 This flexibi lity is not without its problems . One member of the committee 
"filed a statement designRted 'dubitante' in which he expressed significant due 
process and equal protection reservations" with the ntle. Daly, suprn note 2, at 
757. 
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Rdvocates contain no such qualifying language, and hence permit 
no discretione1ry ana lysis regarding which rules would be 
appropriate. The justificZ�tion for this inflexibility is that the 
advocate1s ethiccd obligations are firmly tethered to the location of 
the adjudicatory decisionmaker. 
There are good rce�sons for specia I choice-of-law rules that 
apply exclusively to adjudicatory settings, and for linking those 
rules to the adjudicatory dccisionmaker. One of the most p ressing 
reC�sons for insisting on a clear rule is to avoid the possibility th21t 
opposing attorneys in the same proceed1ng cou ld be su bject to 
different ethical rule.s. As Detlcv Vagts cogently explains: 
[I]t would not be workable to allow the counsel for 
opposing sides in a civil case to enter the courtromn subject 
to different rules . . . .  It wou l d  not do to prohibit one lawyer 
from a civil law jttrisdiction from intexviewing a witness 
before the trial while the Amctican lawyer would not only 
be a !lowed to do so but "would be guilty of professional 
negligence if he or she presented an un-intcrviewed 
witness." 32 
While this equality-of-arms consideration is a powerful reason 
to regulate attorneys appearing in international and transnational 
adjudicatory settings,33 as illustrated below, application of Rule 8.5 
fails to ensure the desired result.34 Even worse, in som.e contexts it 
may actually increase the likelihood that attorneys in the same 
adjudkation will be abiding by different rules. 
Another reason why adjudicatory settings deserve special rules 
is that presiding tribunals are presumed to have a particularized 
interest in regulating attorneys appearing before them, as well as 
32 Detlev Vagts, Professional Responsibility in Transborder Practice: Conflict and 
Resolution, 13 GEO. j. LEGAL ETHICS 677, 690 (2000). 
33 Impartiality is an attribute of adjudicators, which in  tt:trn demands nudi 
nlteram partem, or equality of the parties. See, e.g., V.S. MAN!, INTERNATIONAL 
ADJUDICATION: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 16-17 (1980) (discussing the irnportance of 
nudi alteram partem in the formation of procedt\ral rules) . As told in the Sanskrit 
play Mric/zchakntica, as far back as 485 B.C., courts in lndia honored this principle 
by not allowing the fact that a complainant �was the king's brother-in-law to 
influence the court's integrity. [d. at 17. 
34 See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (discussing the potential 
effects Rule 8.5 may have on the proceedings in front of the Jnternational Court of 
Justice). 
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particular authority over the conduct of those atlorneys.15 An 
ordinary dwice-of-Jaw rule based on the weight of territorial 
contacts, as found in the other provisions of Ruh:� 8.5, might not 
gi vc adequate deference to the tribunal's interest or proced ural 
authority. \A/bi le f�ule 8.5 ties applicable ethical rules to the 
tribunal, however, i t  dues not afford them an explicit role in 
€·nforcing those rules . .:<11 This oversight is not a d i rect affront to 
international tribunals, lTtcmy of which do not contemplate for 
themsel\'es an C'<press role in regulating attortteys who appear 
before them. It is, however, a missed opportunity lo help U.S. 
regulatory anthorities in interpreting and enforcing tht' c1pplicable 
rulcs . .17 
2.3. Blutry Unes nnd Buiit-ln Ambiguities 
The stated aim of the current version of Rule 8.5 is  to provide 
for Jlrelatively simple, bright-line rules"3s for 21ttorneys and 
regulators to determine what ethical rules apply to 
multi jurisdiction.al, and now also transnational, legal acti vi.ties. 
,, Sinct2 Rule l .l  went into effecl, federal judges have shovvn a w•illinb'lless to 
make use of i l  to regul0te Jttorneys appeari11g before them. See, e.g., Victor H. 
Kramer, Vicwiug Rule 1 1 as n Tool to l111pruve Profe.c.sionnl l\espo11sibility, 75 MINN. L. 
Rt\'. 793, 793 (1991) (noting that ''[i]n lh� seven years since Rule 11 was arnended, 
it h<lS gen�;r<1 ted well over a thousAnd judicial opinions"). On the other hand, 
" [tlhe majority of ContinentC11 rules of civil procedure and lhose influenced by 
thern impose no direct compulsory snnctions.'' Rolf Sti.irner, Tmns1rnlional Civil 
Procedure: Discovery n11d Sanctiolls Against Non�Complinnce, 6 UNIPOJ<M L. REV. 871, 
877 (2001). Fmnce, however, does allow for an "aslreinte," a type of procedurcd 
fine, although the application of this principle is very rare in practice. Jd. 
11> International <u-bitral tribunals do not necessarily enjoy the competence to 
enforce national ethjcal rules. See i11jra notes 78-79 and accompanying text 
(discussing how international tribunals often lack the rules or jurisdiction to 
enforce ethical conduct). 
37 See mfrn Section 4.4 (discussing how to find the right agent to regulate 
lawyers 1nternC1honally). 
38 Tbe purpose was specifically to make "as straightforward as possible" 
which rules apply, a goal that is described by the Comments to the Rule as being 
"in the best interest of both clients and the profession." ABA COMM. ON ETHICS 
AND PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, RECOMMENDATION AND REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF 
DELEGATES 4 (1993). Professors Geoffrey Hazard and William Hodes have argued 
that making Rule 8.5 applicable to international law practice was done in response 
to insistence by French professional regulatory authorities as a condition of their 
recognition of Americun lawyers as consei/ juridique, or "juridical advisors" in 
English. CEOHRF:Y C HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYEt{ING: 
A H.ANliBOOK ON TrfE MODEl RULES OF PI�OFESSIONAL CONDUCf § 8.5:101 (2d ed. 
Supp.) (1994). Others have questioned the authority for thts justification, which 
does not appear in ihe notes or comments. Daly, supra note 2, at 757. 
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While several of the problems of Rule 8.5 only become apparent in 
its .:1ppl ication,J<.l others are evidenl from its very wording. These 
ambiguous references appear to result principally fron1 the fact 
that the Rule was written against the backgTound of assumptions 
that apply in domestic contexts. This Section exposes the 
concep t u a l  and interpretative problt"nls raised by the text of Rule 
8.5, whereas Section 3 will  take up more generally whether the 
substantive provisions of the Rule are appropriate for interncttion;::d 
a dvocates. 
1.3. 1 .  Geogmplzicnl Location mut Etltical Rule::. 
A fundamental assumption u nderlying Rule 8.5 is that there is 
a meaningful link between the place of adjudic21bon and the 
deci..sionrnaker's jL1risdiction. This assumption is undoubtedly 
predicated on the fact that such C1 link is general ly present in the 
domestic U.S. court systems where Rule 8.5 was originally 
intended to apply. However, no comparable system;;�tic or 
meaningful link generally exists with international courts and 
tribunals. 
In domestic systems, the jurisdiction of a court, and the identity 
of advocates who practice before it, are detern1ined by the 
geographic realities of where it is located. For exam.ple, the state 
courts of New York are located physically in New York, are 
established under the Constitution of the State of New York, and 
have j urisdiction that is predicated on (even if not strictly limited 
by) the geographic boundaries of New York State. In this example, 
as with all national courts, the identity of the court, its 
jurisdictional mandate, and its place of operation are i nherently 
interconn.ected and effectively indivisible. 1vloreover, 
unauthorized-practice-of-law rules affirm and reinforce the inter­
relationship with place by requiring that all  attorneys who practice 
before a New York court are members of the New York Bar, 
working in association with a lawyer who i s  a member of the New 
York Bar or admitted to the New York Bar pro hoc vice.40 This 
39 These problems are discussed infra Section 3. 
�o Specifically, Model Rule 5.5(a) provides: "A lawyer shall not practice law 
in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that 
jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.  
5.S(a) (2002). For a more thorough analysis of the rules restricting practice in 
slates where attorneys are not licensed, see generally Charles W. Wolfram, Snetllcing 
Around in /he Legal P r�fessio/1: In te1:iurisdictional Llnt111 tlwri zed Practice l1y 
Tnwsnctional L.muyers, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 665 (1995). 
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interconnectedness is a consequence of the fact thRt nation2ll courts 
are instrm11ents of national sovereignty (or related political sub­
d ivisions), which in turn is an jnherently territorial-be1sed 
concept:H 
The same inter-relationship \Vith place does not ordinarily exist 
with either international courts or other in ternCi tionol tribunals. 
Instead, with public international courts and tribunals, prec ise ly 
the opposite is true.�2 The physical location of most intern21tional 
tribunals is either an arbi tra ry choice produced through historical 
accident, negoiiation, and compromise, or a choice predica ted on 
other non-substantive issues such as conveniencc.4' As. a resul t ,  
and in contrast to domestic courts, nonnallv the location of an J 
international tribunal is intentlonaJly and systemcttical ly  unrelated 
to the tribunal's jurisdiction and procedures, or to the presmYtptive 
identity of the lawyers who appear before it:H This dc.tacbment 
from the local procedures of the tribunal's geographic seal is one 
feature that makes a tribunal " international."45 l t  also means that 
1 1  See Rog�:'r H. Transgrud, Tin• Federal COT/1111011 Lnw of Pcrsonl!l Ju ri:;diclil'll, 57 
CEO. WASH. L. REV. 849, 871-72, S72 nn.l'l6-20 (1989) (describing relationship 
betwet:n original rules of jttrisdiction and rules of territorial sovereignty, and 
listing e<trly cases that appro<tched jurisdiction based on international Jaw). 
n For a diSCLtSsion of international arbitration tribunals and legal domicile, 
see infra notes 48-54, and accompanying text. 
-13 For example, the U.S.-[ran Claims Tribunal was located i n  The Hague 
because of the ready availability of the Peace Palace, suppart from the Dutch 
government, and The Hague's history of netJtrality. See Michael I .  Kaplan, Solvillg 
tlze Pitjnlls of Tntpnrtiality whe1z Arbilrnting in Chilln: How tit!! Lessons of the Soviet 
Llnioll mzd 1rnn Ctm Provide Solutions to Westem Parties ArbitrntiJI� in Chinn, 110 
PENN Sr. L. REv. 769, 801 (2006) (attributing the success of the Tribunal to The 
Hague's ''chronicled history of neuh·ality"). 
4-t There are some instances in whjch international tribunals have jurisdiction 
over domestic crimes, which may imply the presence of lawyers from the relevant 
jurisdiction. For example, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is a treaty-based 
Tribunal that was established through a resolution of the U.N. SeCLlrity Council. 
Jt is unique, and somewhat controversial, in that i t  depends solely on substantive 
crimes that are defined under domestic Lebanese law. See Nidal Nabil Jurdi, Tlze 
Subject-Matter Ju ri�dictio11 of the Specinl Tribunal For Lelumon, 5 J .  lNT' L CRI:vl. JusT. 
1125, 1126 (2007) (contrasting the Special Tribw1al for Lebanon with tribunals for 
other nations such as Sierra Leone, Iraq, and Bosnia, among others) . 
.JS There are also "hybrid international-domestic tribunals (such as the ad hoc 
Court for East Timor, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia)." Michael P. Scharf, FMwnrd: Lesso11s Fro1i1 
The Sadrlanz Trinl, 39 CAS£ W. R.Es. j.  JNTL. L. 1 , 1  (2006). Another recent example of 
a hybrid international-domestic tribunal is the Iraqi High Tribtmal (IHT) in 
Baghdad: 
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U.S. 'lawyers practicing before the lnternabonal Court of Justice or 
the Iran-U.S. Cla j ms Tribunal in The Hague do not expect to be 
governed by the ethical rules applicable m local judicial 
proceedings in The Netherlands. 
This disconnect between place, ju risdictionr and legal 
background o.f advocates seems to have been acknowledged, a l  
least implicitly, by Ruthorities who might otherwise a t ternpt to 
regulate attorneys appearing before international tribunals within 
their jurisdiction. Unauthorized-practice-of-law requirements, 
which govern appearances in local com·ts and sometimes apply to 
domestic Rrbitrations, most often exempt international 
arbitrations.-+6 Meanwhile, no State has sought to inject its 
professional regulation of attorneys into the activities of 
international tribunals that might be located in their territory . .J7 As 
{i/, 
The JHT merits characterization CIS an int-ernationalized domestic 
tribunal because its stntute and rules of procedure are modeled on the 
U.N. war crimes tribunals . �  . and its statLtte provides that the IHT is to 
be guided by the precedent of the U.N. ttibunals and that its judges nnd 
prosecutors are lo be assisted by international experts. But the lHT fs not 
fully international or even international enough to be dubbed a hybrid 
court, since it is se<lted in Baghdad, its prosecutor is Iraqi, it uses the Iraqi 
Criminal Code to supplement the provisions of its statute and rules, and 
its bench is composed exclusively of Iraqi judges. 
• r, Even the California Supreme Court case that touched off the firestorm of 
concern about multijurisdictional practice by finding that New York lawyers in an 
arbitration in California were engaged in the unauthorized practice of law 
included r1 footnote exempting international arbitration hom its analysis. See 
Birbrower1 Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court., 949 P.2d 1,  7 
(Cal. 1998) (noting that the California Code of Civil Procedure permits parties to 
an international cmnmercial dispute to either "appear in person or be represented 
or assisted by any person of their choice," regardless of whether that person is 
licensed to practice law in California or any other jurisdiction) . 
.J7 In something of a histodcal oddity, some jurisdictions insist that party 
representatives in international arbitrations be lawyers and, i n  some more 
unusual instances, that they be locally licensed lawyers. This latter requirement 
can be understood as an assertion of jurisdiction to regulate attorneys appearing 
in an arbitration within a State's territory, though today virtually all jurisdictions 
have eliminated such rules. Sec Richard A. Eastman, Commetcial Arbitration ­
Representation by Foreign Cou11sel- Lllegal Practice of Law in California, 94 AM. J. TNT' L 
LAI,V 382, 403 (Bernard H. Oxman ed., 2000) (discussing the trend in many 
countries of "liberalizing the right of representation"). Jn the United States, 
several states have prohibited appearances by out-of-state lawyers in in-state 
arbitrations as the "unauthorized practice of law." Tn other cases, they have 
limited the number of arbitration appearances that are permitted. Somewhat 
surprisingly, these controversial provisions usually contain exceptions for 
international arbitration. This exception is odd since outside of internatione1l 
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a result, international tt·ibunals operate as regulatory oases from 
the perspective of local d isciplinc1ry authorities in. the terri tory 
where they e1re located. The fact that national regule1tory 
au thoribes do 110t actively Jssert any interest in the operations of 
international tribLmals suggests thal these national regula tory 
a·uthorities, whose nlles are supposed to apply, have implicitly 
rejected the choice of ethical rules :;elected by Rule 8.5.  fVloreovcr, 
i t  foreshadows the need for specialized ndes for these tribunals 
and raises implicit doubh ,1bout the c1ppropriateness of usmg 
territory-based choice-of-lcnv rules as a substitute. 
2.3.2. Where Does a Trilnnwl "Sit"? 
Another textual a1nbiguity in Rule 8.5 is its equation of an 
international tribLmar s legal s i tus with the place where i t  "sits." 
Under Rule 8.5, the ethical rules of the place where a tribunal "sits" 
apply to a U.S. attorney's conduct in com1ection with proceedings 
before that tribunal. Within the United States, the term ''sits'' is 
uncontroversial because domestic courts only sit, and consequently 
arbitration contexts, foreign attorneys are not allowed to peTfonn any other legal 
activities without being licensed or obtaining permission to practice in the state. 
St?e Steven C. f\:elson, A111cricall Bor Assodntion Sccfiall u{ fnternntional Law w1d 
Practice Reports to the Housl! of Delegates, 24 INT'L LAW. 583 (l990) (discussing claims 
arising from international sale of goods); George A. Riemer, A State of Flux: Trends 
ill tlze Regulation of Multijurisdictional Pmcticc of Law, 64 OR. ST. B. BULL. 19 (2004) 
(focusing on the regulations and the possible future trends and problems 
regarding ternporary practice). Sec also r\BA Center for Prof'] Responsibility, Stote 
Implementation of ABA MJP Policies (Mar. 3, 2009), available nt 
http:// www.abanet.org/cprjmjp/recommedations.pdf (providing a reference 
chart regarding various state rules); Stephen Gillers, it's an MJP World: Model Rules 
Revisions Open the Door for Lawyers to Work Outside Their Home Jurisdictions, 88 
A.B.A- f. 51 (Dec. 2002) (describing the revision of ABA Model Rule 8.5 as a 
response to Birbrower). The exception for international arbitrations arguably 
provides foreign lawyers greater rights than attorneys from sister states, who 
should presumably be entitled to greater leeway, not less, than foreign attorneys. 
The international exception essentially pennits foreign attorneys to appear in any 
arbitration (since their participCllion wou.ld almost by definition sig11al the 
international character of a case), whereas attorneys from other states can only 
appear in some cases, namely those that are international. Other states have 
similar rules. See FLA. BAR REG. R. 1-3.11 cmt. (2009) (''This rule applies to 
arbitration proceedings held in Florida where 1 or both parties are being 
represented by a lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction or a non­
United States jurisdiction . . . .  Howe\'er, entire portions of subdivision (d) and 
subdivision (e) do not apply to internalion<�! arbitrations. ''), 
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have their "scat" or " legal donrici le,''-lt-: in one p lace.-19 With 
international tribunals, however, then:� are a diversity of 
arrangements, vvhich make it difficult to ddennine where a 
tribunal II sits" within the meaning of Rule 85. 
InterT1ahonal tribunals may " sit" in one place, but have their 
" seat" in another. For example, the Statute for the In ternational 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea provides that the Tribunal has its 
'/seat" in "the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg in the Federal 
Republic of Ccxmcmy/' but  11 1l1ciY sit and exercise i ts  functions 
elsevvhere whene\'er it considers this desirable.":>o With 
international ou blic law tribunals, such as the Tribuna I for the Law ' 
of the Sea, the separa tion of the tribunal's seat from the location of 
actual hearings is rare, although not unheard oL The same is not 
true of i nternational arbitra I tribunals. 
The ''seat" of an international cu-bilration is not simply a point 
on a map, but is i.nstead a legal concept that attaches a host of 
important consequences to the proceedings and the resulting 
award. As Gary Born explains, 1'the procedural law of the 
arbitration is virtua\1v a!wavs the law of lhe arbitral state, which .. . 
governs both the 'internal' and 'external' procedural aspects of the 
arbilration.''SI For these reasons, i nterna tional arbitration can be 
said to .have a I/ rootedness" to its seat52 that public international 
tribunals do n o t  generally have. It is relatively com.m.on for 
international arbih·al tribunals to hold hearings and meetings :ll1 
·IS 1 GAI�Y 'BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1240 (2009) 
(defining ''seat" to meCln "leg2l1 domicile" or "juridical ho1ne" and h·acing the 
concept to relevant international conventions and national laws). 
49 One historiet1l exception is that U.S. Circuit court judges and Supreme 
Cow-t justices ''rode a circuit" fron1 court to court, which is where circuit couTts 
got their name. For a brief history of a circuit riding, see David R. Stras, Why 
Supreme Court Justices Slwuld Ride Agailz, 91 MLNN. L. REV. 1710, 1714-17 (2007). 
;;o United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea annex VII, Statute of the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea art. 1, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397 (emphasis added). 
st 1 BORN, supra note 48, at 1243. In the absence of party agreement, the law 
of the seat can impose procedural and evidentiary requirements and prohibitions, 
as well as provide default rules that act as gap fillers. ld. Meanwhile, the courts 
in the arbitral seat may provide important functions in support of the arbitration, 
such as facilitating arbitrator appointments (Clgain in  the absence of agreement), 
ruling on arbitrator challenges, issuing interim relief or ordering documentary or 
testimonial ev.ideJ.Ke. See /d. 
52 fci. a t 1250. 
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places other than the legal "sea t"53 _ jn a li teral sense, to "sit" in a 
place other than the a rbitra l "seat." On some OCCilSions, the "seat" 
of an arbitration can be implied legally and di ffer entirely front 
either the place identified by the parties or the place where the 
hearings physica lly tc�ke plJce.s.t In these (rare) circun1stances, the 
language of Rule 8.5, vvhicb rdcrs to the place where tribunal 
"si ts/' raises even more significant ambiguities about how il i.s 
i ntended to be applied in the context of arbilra l proceedings. 
Ultimately, for reasons that are explained below/5 international 
tribunals must develop their own ethical rules. It seems inevitable 
that conscripting n21tional ethical rules into service be accepted i n  
the short run as a tempora ry1 second best solution. Even as c:t 
temporary solution, ho·wever1 those rules should not be identified 
based on the jurisdiction w here an international arbitration 
tTibunal "sits/' but instead where i t  has its ''seat." Otherwise, Rule 
8.5 ascribes to the place where an a tribunal sits an importance that 
was never intended by either the architects of these tribunals or the 
parties appearing before them. 
2.3.3. Whnt "Rules" (�f C01zduct Apply? 
Another ambiguity revealed tlu·ough the application of Rule 8.5 
is that i t  designates the "ruJes'1 of the place where a tribunal sits. 
In the domestic context, the term " rules" would seem to refer to the 
code of attorneys' professional conduct in a sister state .. Arguably, 
even i n  the domestic context, this definition would be incomplete. 
As several scholars have identified, 11 [t]he ru les and institutions 
53 ld. at 1249. All leading institutional arbitration rules and many arbitration 
stahttes have similar provisions. See, e.g., LONDON CT. 11\IT'L ARBITRATJON R., cut. 
16.2 (1998) ("The Arbitral Tribunal may hold hearings, meetings and deliberations 
a t  any convenient geographical place in its discretion; and if elsewhere than the 
seat of the arbitration, the arbitration shall be treated as an arbitration conducted 
a t  the seat of the arbitration and anv award as an award made at the seat of the 
arbitration for all purposes."); UI{ited Natjons Comm'n on Jnt'l Trade Law 
[UNCITRAL], Arbitration Rules, G.A Res. 31/98, art. 16(2), U.N. Doc. A/31/17 
(1976) ("The arbitral tribunal may . . .  hear witnesses an.d hold meetings for 
consultation among its members at any p lace it deems appropriate, having regard 
to the circumstances of the arbitration."). 
5� For example, an English court recently ruled that the legal seat of an 
arbitration was England where the parties had provided for the application of 
English procedural law, nohvithstanding the parties' purported designation in 
their contract of Scotland as the seat of the arbitration. See Braes of Doune Wind 
Farm (Scotland) Ltd, v. Alfred McAlpine Bus. Servs. Ltd. [2008 ) EWliC 426 (TCC). 
55 Sec infm Section 4.4. 
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controlling lawyers' conduct comprise a complex systen1''S6 thot 
en1bodies not only eth ics rules embodied in codes, but also 
stc1tu tes, procedural rules, inherent judicial power, agency law, 
criminal law, and tort law . '57 Thus, for exclmple, if t he California 
Bar Court were to determine under Rule 8.5 that Nevada's rules of 
conduct apply to a particular instance of alleged lack of di l igence 
and competence, it wil l  look not  only to the Nevada Rules of 
Professional Conduct/ but also to Nevada's bar association <:md 
judicial opinions interpreting and applying those rules, as well  as 
to proced ural rules and ma lpract ice standards that give meaning 
and context to those rules. In other words, identifying the 
appl icable " rules" of another jurisdiction is not as simple as 
opening a book to the page where its code of conduct is written.ss 
I n  cross-border contexts, identifying the applicable rules can be 
much more difficult. As an initial matter, the codification of ethical 
rules is a relatively recent phenomenon and not all foreign 
jurisdictions have reduced their standCirds of conduct to such 
codes.59 Even i n  countries that have written codes, such as 
jfl See, e.g., Peter A. Joy, Tltl1 Relationship Bel1uew Civil Rule 1 1  nnd Lawyer 
0 isciJ1! inc; A 11 E111pirical /\naly::i� 5 uggesli 11X I /I Sf itu tio11al Cleo ices in the l�egula t ion of 
Lat11ycrs, 37 LOY. L.A . L. REV. 76 5, 797 (2004). 
57 Sec Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, R11/c, Stm�J, nnd Cmmnihnent in 
lhe Tenching of Legal Ethics, 38 Wtvl. & MARY L. REV. 145, 174 (1996) (examining 
strategies of legal ethics courses jn law school) . 
.;s This observation reveals a larger problem: drafters of Rule 8.5 apparently 
did not consider how its application to inter-state practice mjght be different from 
international or transnational practices. Important differences d o  exist, however, 
whicJ< have c.ritical implications for regulation of attorney ethics and conduct. 
The ethical r·ttles of individual U.S. states are relatively homogenous because the 
ethical rules of n1ost individual stales are predicated on the 1\BA's Model Rules. 
As a result, there are only isolated, even if occasionally significant, differences 
between the etlucal rules of state regulatory authorities. More importantly, 
because they are borne out of the same legal culture and operate in largely similar 
legal systems, generally no one is rea!Jy offended, for example, jf an a t torney 
abides by Florida confidentiality rules instead of Alabama rules. 
SR By conh·ast, the ethic a 1 rules among various nations, and the national legal 
frameworks in which they exist, are considerably more variable than among the 
ethical regimes of individual U.S. jurisdictions. As a result of these differences, 
regulatory at.1 thodties i n  different national jurisdictions may be profoundly 
concerned if foreign attorneys violate local ethical norms, as illustrated by the 
crirninalization of, and diplomatic protests against, certain activities by foreign 
lawyers, such as serving process or taking depositions. See supra note 15 and 
accompanying text. 
59 "ln most countries the rules governing lawyers are set by statute." PIETER 
t-l.F. BEKKER ET AL., AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L l., REPORT0f 1'IIE ASTL TASK tORG ON lNTl 
PROF1L RESPONSJ131LITY 7 & n.19 (2007), m'nilnb!t: a/ http:( /www.asil .org/pdfs 
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England, there remain " rnany unwri tten rules of p rofessional 
cond·uct.''60 I t  is unclear what role, if a ny, "unwritten rules" shou l d  
have if, for example, a U S .  bar were applyjng English ethic2d rules 
under Rule 8.5. 
Even when a foreign jtnisdict.ion has a written code of conduct, 
there are complex and del icate questions abou t how to establish or 
" prove'' the precise content or i n terpretation of those rules. When 
fore"ign substantive lavv governs a particular issue in U.S. litigation, 
it cannot simply be researched by the court, particulculy if the law 
is in a d ifferenl language 61 As a res u lt, i t  is often presented 
through experts/'2 potentially m u l tiple experts, who may disagree. 
Ethics is an area where difficulties of proof are potentially even 
more complicated than substantive law. ln the United States, even 
with respect to purely local practice, there are m u l tiple,  often 
overlapping or inconsistent bodies of rules that purport to regulate 
paTticular attorney conduct_63 When lhe rules are foreign, written 
in a foreign language, interpreted through foreign precedents, and 
potentially introduced through competing experts, the room for 
confusion and uncertainty may be considerable. A t  least one 
drafter of Rule 8.5 expressed a pprehension about the due process 
implications of ambigui ties regarding which rules apply.64 
/ taskforcereporLpdf (citing Law No. 71-1130 of Dec. 3L 1971, Journal Officiel de 
Ia Republique Fran�aise Q.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Dec 31, 1971, p. 167, 
the Bundesanwaltsordnung [Federal Rules of Procedure], Jan. 15, 1959 BGBL 1 at 
565 (F.RG.), and the Practicing Attorneys Act, Law No. 205 of 1949 Qapan)). 
60 Maimon Schwarzschild, Clnss, Nntionnl Chnmcter, nnd the Bnr Reforms i11 
Britain: Will 17tere Always Be nn £,zgln11d?, 9 CONN.j .  INT'L L 185, 196 (1994): 
61 See Louise Ellen Teitz, Fro111 lhe Courthouse in Tohc1go fo the l11femcf: The 
Incrensillg Need lo Prove Foreign Law in U.S. Courts, 34 J. MAR. L & COtvL 97, 111 
(2003) ("The problem is exacerbated when the foreign law is in another language, 
and the court must either rely on a treatise in English or a tnmslation of a foreign 
treatise."). 
62 See id. at 107 ("The testimony of experts allowed to offer opinions under 
the Federal Rules of Evidence often fom•s the basis for a court's determination of 
the foreign law."). 
63 As one joint committee by the ALI and the ABA concluded, "No area of 
local rulernaking has been more fragmented than local rules governing attorney 
conduct." American Law Institute-American Bar Association, Excerpts Franz 
Special Study Co11Jerence of Federal l?.ulcs Governing Attorney Conduct Los Angeles, 
Califomia fnnunry 9-10, 1996, Q247 A.L.l.-AB.A CONTINUING LEGAL Eouc 311, 333 
(1996). As a result, the same report explains, ambiguities raised by the existence 
of ambiguous and multiple bodies of overlapping rules h<�s "l!:!d t\J due process 
and 'void for vagueness' challenges in increasing numbers.'' fd. at 343. 
<"" Letter from David B. Isbell to Stephen Gillers (December '2, 1992), in 
SusannB Fellem<m, Ethicnl Oil!?JI!IIIas nnd tl1c Mul ti�tnfl' Lnrcttcr: A Propost?d 
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A part front the potential problems of identifying and 
interpreting rules governing pnrticu lar conduct, there are also 
questions about the role of social and custornary practices that can 
often alter the essential meaning of a rule. Consider, for example, 
two recent empirical studies t ha t investigated professional conduct 
in the United Stales and England. The studies evalua ted levels of 
compliance with conflict of interest rules among An1ericcm lawyers 
and English solicitors.r.5 Both systems operate in the same 
l � mgL1age and originate from the same legal tradition, and 
apparently have relatively similar detailed written rules regarding 
such conflicts. When the results of the two studies are compared, 
however, they scent to suggest that textual similarity conceals 
significant divergences in their appl ications.o6 Apparently, U.S. 
attorneys are 1nore fastidious in their efforts to comply with 
conflicl rules, even when such adherence is contrary to their 
business inteTests. Englisll solicitors, on the other hand, appear to 
be more willing to bypass rules that are obsolescent or 
counterproductive. 
Various hypotheses may account for these disparate rates of 
compliance, including differences in enforcement mechanisms,67 in 
the likelihood of negative social sanctions, in client tolerance, in the 
contpelitive structure of the legal services market, or in perceptions 
of the possibility of genuine harm. Regardless of why these 
differences exist, however, they raise important questions about 
the complexities about how the regulatory authorities of one nation 
can apply the "rules" of another. Could or should a U.S. state 
supreme court or regulatory authority account for the social 
A111t!11dment to the Choice-of-Law Rule in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 1500, 1515 n.l16 (1995) (explaining that an amendmen t to Rule 8.5 
would ''set out a relatively clear and sjmple set of choice of law rules'' which 
would "be of considerable practical value to practitioners") .  
65 See NaJ1cy J .  Moore, Regulating Law Firm Conjlict8 in the 21st Century: 
l111plica/io11S of the Globnlization of Legnl Services and the Growth of the "Mega Fir/11,11 18 
GEO. J .  LEGAL ETHICS 521 (2005) (comparing ]ANINE GRrFFJTHS-8AKER, SERVING TWO 
MASTERS: Co�Fucrs OF (NTEREST IN THE MODERN LAW FtRl\.1 (2002), witlz SUSAN 
SHAPIRO, TANGLED LOYALTIES: CONFLICT OF 1NTEHEST IN LEGAL PRACTfCE (2002)). 
(>6 See id. 
61 ln the United States, departure from the rule is likely to draw a 
disqu<1lification rnotion from opposing co�,msel. The United States is nearly 
unique in p�rrni tting opposing counsel to raise motions for disqua lificat ion, and 
certainly unique 1n allow ing the disqual iricatlon process to rise to the level of 
l itigation strategy. Sec GRIFFITHS-BAKER, �upm note 65, at 77-78 (noting that 
disqualification actions by attorneys gre\-v in Europe with the arrival of U.S. law 
firms}. 
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context anct institutional functions of the Juthorities that would 
apply the relevant foreign elhicaJ rules? For example, in applying 
English conflict of interest rules, should a U.S. regulatory au thority 
take account of the fact that Engli�h a ttorncys are not actually 
punished for certain types of viole1 tions? The underlying 
justi fication for Rule 8.5 seems to be that a lJ.S. advocate appearing 
in proceedings in a foreign ju risdiction should be regulated as an 
attorney from thst jurisdiction. Literal application of foreign 
ethicaJ rules, without regard to how they are interpreted and 
applied by the national regulatory bodies, would alter - sometimes 
dramatica l l y - the nature and meaning of those rulesY' These 
com.plications in interpreting and ap�1lying foreign ethical rules 
make it difficult for U.S. attorneys to accurately understand the 
rules against which their condvct wil l  be m.e8surcd. 
2.3.4. Wliat is a "Mnttcr"? 
The advocacy provisions of Rule 8.5 are predicated on a model 
that assumes that there is a single ''matter'' pending before one 
" tribunal" for any particular dispute. While this may be a dubious 
proposition in any large, complex domestic caser it is certainly 
faulty with regards to sizable international disputes. Various legal, 
procedural, and strategic di fferences between national systems 
create even more powerful incentives for parties to forum shop in 
i nternational cases than in purely domesttc cases.69 As a result, 
parties to the same international dispute often seek to litigate 
simultaneously i n  the courts o f  two or more countriesJO Moreover, 
i n  the absence of transfer, consolidation, shared j urisdictional 
precepts, and any international equivalent to the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause for enforcement of judgments, a transnational case is 
more likely to be l i tigated in multiple courts than a purely 
domestic case. Even within a single case, judicial cooperation is 
often necessary, for example, to obtain discovery from foreign 
sources or to enforce a final judgment in a foreign jurisdiction. 
68 As David Wilkins has persuasively demonstrated, when domestic U.S. 
institutions apply rules, they necessarily impose a "substantive tilt" that is the 
product of their own instihltionetl history and objectives, as well as conceptual 
and cultural biases. Wilkins, supra note 9, at 851.  The force of this observation is 
amplified when the cultural and historical t,raditions of those institutions span 
national and l inguistic boundaries. 
<>9 GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CrVJL LITIGATION rN 
UNITED STATES COURTS 521 (4th ed. 2007). 
71 1 See id. 
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Tbis potential for multiple courts to be involved in a single c;:1se 
challenges the underlying rnodE:d on which Rule 8.5 is based, vvhich 
contemplates a single " matter" thal is "pending before" one 
tribunal. An earlier version of the Rule had referred to the more 
delimited term "proceeding" (instead of " matter").''l The purpose 
of the new language, according to the Ethics 2000 Conuniss.ion 
Reporter's Explanation of Recommendabon, was to extend the 
Rule so that it "control(s] from the moment the matter ca11 be said 
to be before a tribunal (typically the date the case is filed), even i f  
no specific 'proceeding' is pending at  the time the conduct 
occurs."72 Allhough th.e Reporter's Explanation goes on to state 
that ' ' [n]o change in substance is intended,"73 the new fonnulation 
i1ppears to create an ambiguity in international cases. 
Consider, for example, a case that is pending before the federal 
district court in the Southern District of New York, bul which 
requires that a deposition be taken before (in effect taken by) a 
judicial officer in Germany or Brazil. In international cases 
l i t igated in U.S. courts, Rule 8.5 would require that the professional 
conduct of a ttorneys abroad is subject only to evaluation under a 
relevant state's etlucal rules as long as that conduct was " in  
connection with" a case pending in  a U.S. court. As noted in  the 
introduction, however, like many other countries Germany and 
Brazil both ethically and legal1y prohibit attorneys from taking a 
deposition o f  a witness./4 The judicially administered deposition in 
Germany or Brazil would not be considered a " proceeding" under 
71 Although the term "proceeding'' is not defined in the Model Rules, the 
Canons of Judicial Ethics define a "pending proceeding" as a process that will 
reach a "final disposition." See MODEL CODE OF juD. CoNDUcr Canon 3(B)(9) cmt. 
(2003) (defining the phrase "pending proceeding"). This definition comports with 
other common definitions of " proceedings" as roughly equivalent to 
"adjudication." See BLACK's LAW DICfiONARY 45, 1251 (8th ed. 2004) (defining the 
terms "proceedings" and "adjudication"). 
n Reporter's Explanation, supra note 21, at 830. 
73 ld. 
74 According to the U.S. Department of State: 
Tlw Government of Brazil asserts that under Brazilian Constitutional 
Law, only Brazilian judicial authorities are competent to perform acts of 
a judicial nature in Brazil. Brazil has advised it would deem takjng 
depositions in Brazil by foreign persons to be a violation of Brazil's 
;udicial sovereignty. Such action potentially could result in the arrest, 
detention, expulsion, or deportation of the American attorney or other 
American participants. 
U.S. Dep'i of State, Brm:il fudicinl Assistance (2009), t1-uoilnble at 
http:// lri.lvel .state.gov/ lcrw / info/judicia1/judicia l_672.ht1Yil . 
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the former version of the Ru le, whicl1 would make it easv to J 
determine that New York rules apply. Under the newly broadened 
terminology, however, the deposition would arguabl y be a 
" n.1.atter"7" that is "pendj11g'' i n  th.e German court/1.1 and as a resul l  
there would be lwo ''matters" that" are "pending" and the activities 
of the lawyer in Germany could be said to be " in connection with" 
either or both of them. 
By using the term " rnatter/1 Rule 8.5 does not succeed in c learly 
ind icating a single set or ethical rules that a pply to given conduct. 
Instead, it raises the possi bil i ty that the ru les of rnore than one 
ju risd iction may be appticd.77 The resulting confusjon u x1.dermines 
the brightline guidance thCit Ruie 8.5 was supposed to bri ng, even 
if, as argued below, the very goal of a single brightline rule for any 
par t icu la r case may itself be a f121wcd objective. 
2.4. Conclu!'ion 
For activities before international tribunals, many of the 
interpretive problems of RuJe 8.5(b)(:l) could be avoided if those 
tribunals had their own ethica [ rules, which would then apply 
under Rule 8.5(b)(2). Unfortuna tely, while the need for such rules 
seems pal pable, only a few interna tiona 1 tribunal s have created 
them. The International Criminal Tribuna] for the former 
Yugoslavia ("ICTY"), and more recent ly the International Crjminal 
Court/ have adopted codes for professional conduct for attorneys 
appearing before them. The WTO Appellate Body and the 
International Court of Justice have declined to take this step, while 
75 The Model Rules do not define the term "matter." Some rules do. For 
example, the District of Columbia Bar's Rule of Professional Conduct l.O{h) 
defines "matter" to mean "any litigation, administrative proceeding, lobbying 
activity, application, claim, investigation, arrest, charge or accusation, the drafting 
of a contract, a negotiationf estate or family relations practice issue, or any other 
representation, except as expressly limited i n  a particular rule." Under this 
definition, the German court-supervised deposition would apparently constitute a 
"matter.'' D.C. BAR R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT 1 .O(h), available at 
http:// www.dcbar.org/ for_lawyers/ efhics/legal_eth.ics/ rules_oLprofessional 
_conduct/ amended_ru les/ rule_one/ ndeOJ_OO.cfm. 
i6 Note that the text of Rule S.S leaves uncertainly about which ethical rules 
apply does not suggest that there should only be rules from a single jurisdiction 
that governs an advocate's conduct. 
17 Since the Reporter's Explanation indica tes that the change in terminology 
was not intended to result in a substantive change, this Article sets aside this 
ambiguity raised by the term "m<Jlter" and instead treats the current text as 
effectively synonymous with the ec1rlier version of Rule 8.5, 
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i n ternational arbitnll tribunals and arbitral institulions (which 
promtdgate the rules that govern arbitral proceed in.gs) do not 
formally arti.cu late any standards of professional responsibility for 
counsel.7S To lhe contrar::,:, on some occasions arbitral tribunals 
have affinnatively disclaimed r(;'sponsibi l i ty for doing so on the 
grounds that professionCI! rcgulcttion is non-arbi trable or beyond 
the jurisdictional power of lhc trLbunaJ .7'� The next Part explores in 
more detail the problems associclted with applying national ethical 
rules i n  internationC'll proceedings, as well as some of the problems 
wilh the current choice of lavv approach to regulaling attorneys 
involved in transnational l itige� tion. 
3. FROM DRAFTL;�c 0EFt:CI S TO AWKW !\ RD APPUCA TIONS 
The focus until now has been on ambiguities a n d  conceptual 
problems i n  the text of Rule 8.5. This Section takes u p  the more 
substantive problems thai arise when Rule 8.5 is applied i n  specific 
contexts. As expected, the conceptual problems m a nifested i n  the 
text are amplified i n  application of the Rule. 
3 .1 .  Nntionnl Courts 
There is only one instance i n  which Rule 8.5 actually clarifies 
the obligations of an attorney. That is in the relatively peri ph era] 
example of dual-licensed attorneys whose primary legal education 
and licensing is i n  a foreign country, but who also hold an LLM. 
7� As this A Ltthor has argued els�where, despite the formal absence of ethical 
regulation of attorneys in i.nterna tiona! arbitration, such regulation inevitably 
occurs; 
Even if they remain unspoken, such perceptions of apparent misconduct 
(or ineptitude) inevitably affect arbitrators' decisions on the merits, 
cotnputations of damage awards, and assessments of costs and fees . . . .  
These informal sanctions violate the most fundamental notions of 
procedural fairness by imposing punislunents for violations of unknown 
rules and without any opportunity to be heard. Such reactions to 
perceived attorney misconduct might also be sanctioning an  innocent 
party. Clients pay substantive awards, costs, and fees, but the 
misconduct may belong wholly to the attorney. 
Rogers, supra note 15, at 376-77. 
79 Award in ICC Case No. 8879, in HORACIO A. GRlGERA NAON, CHOICE-OF-LAw 
PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL CONhvfERCIAl ARBITRATION, 289 RECUHL DES COURS 9, 
159 (2001 )  (affirming that even if  claims asserted against counsel for on� party for 
ethical violations were within scope of arbih·ation clause, they would be non­
arbitrable, because they concern "the criminal consequences of alleged advocate 
misconduct"). 
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degree from a U.S. law school and ci secondary bar adm.ission in a 
U.S. ju risdiction that perrnits admission for foreign-educated 
applicants.so I t  is estimC�ted Lha l most of t11ese foreign-educated 
le�wvers work either on the transactional side of multi-national law 
firms, or return to their own country of origin, using the U .5. bar 
admission as a credential (not unl ike the LL.ivf. degree i tselr).Sl I n  
the latter instance, these attorneys m ci)' be appearing before the 
national courts o.f their home jurisdictions. Under Rule 8.5, these 
attorneys would not be responsible few ab id ing by the ethical rnles 
of tl1e U.S. jurisdiction from which they obtc:dned their bar­
admission-nun-credential. fn this l imited example, Rule 8.5 seems 
to have its truly desired effect of L' l iminuting appJication of e1 set of 
ethical rules that hcwe little or n o  relevance to particular legal 
e1ctivi ties. In other situa tions, the Rule effectivdy excuses global 
advocates from exercising professional discretion regarding what 
ethical rules to follow. 
3 .1 . 1 .  Ethicnl Discretion i n  Abiding hy Foreign Ethical Rules 
One of the defining features of global advocates is that they 
routinely engage in regulatory arbitrage.8:2 This p rocess requires 
them to evaluate the Inter-relative effects of parbcular rules i n  
determining which ones can or should apply t o  a particular 
situation. This is a unique and valuable skill. When it comes to 
conflicting codes of ethics, however, Rule 8.5 excuses attorneys 
so See Howard A. Levine, Tire RegulntiVII OJ Foreign-Educnted Lawyers in New 
York: The Pnst, Present, nnd Future L�( New York's Role in the Regulntio11 of the 
lntemntionnl Practice of Law, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 631 (2003). While not the 
primary target of Rule 8.5, this group is not insignificant. TI1e number and size of 
LL.M. programs have expanded in recent years, and as a result the number of 
foreign-educated lawyers sitting for U.S. bar exams has increased. In 1992, 972 
foreign-educated lawyers sat for the New York bar examination, while in 2006, 
the number had grown to 3630. Co111pnre 1992 Bnr Exalilination Statistics, B. 
EXAMINER, May 1993, at 23, 26, avr7iloble nt http:/ jwww.ncbex.org/fileadrnin 
/mediafiles/downloads/Bar_Admissions/1992stats.pdf (detailing the total 
number of 1992 bar examinations taken by source of legal education), 1.oitlt 2006 
Statistics, B. EXAMINER May 2007, at 6, 9 nvailnble nt http:/ jwww.ncbex.org 
/ fileadmin/ mediafiles/ downloads/ Bar_Admi.ssions/2006stals.pctf (detailing the 
total number of 2006 bar examinations taken and passed by source of legal 
education). 
Sl See Carole Silver, The Cn-:.e of lite foreign Lnwyer: lnfcrnationa/i:;;ing lite U.S. 
l...egnl Profession, 25 FOHDHAM INT'r. L. J. 1039, 1 050, 1078 (2002) (describing the post­
U.S. bar examination career trends amongst foreign-educated lawyers). 
f;2 St>.P infra Section 4.2. 
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from using this skill or Jrom exercising any professional discretion 
regarding what rules apply to their condtlct. 
Apart from dual-l icensed attorneys with a foreign prim.ary law 
degree, CIS described above, U.S.-Iicensed 21ttorneys rarely appear ns 
advocates i n  foreign legal matters. The most likely sltuation in 
which they take part i n  R foreign proceeding is not as ad vocates, 
but as experts on foreign law or other sui generis roles. For 
example, U.S.-l icensed attorneys might participate in a deposition 
taken before a .foreign j u d icial officer, a.s described above, in 
proceedings to request in lerin1 relief in a U.S. rnatter n1ade to a 
foreign tribunal, or in proceedings to en force Zl U.S. judgment 
abroad. In any of these situations, the fact that these activit ies are 
undertEd<en J'in connection with" a U.S. legal proceeding would 
appear to mean, under Rule 8.5, that U.S. ethical rules would be 
applied in any disciplinary action brought by a U.S. regul a tory 
authority. Since the conflict of laws rule in 8.5(b)(l) does not admit  
any excephonT i t  seems to instruct a uthorities to d isregard 
violations of foreign ethical rules that may occur in these 
situations.s3 
Even though Rule 8.5 would only subject U.S. attorneys to U.S. 
ru les when activities are connected to U.S. proceedings, it would 
not preclude an ethical "dou blc jeopardy" or "double deontology'' 
problem if 21 foreign regulatory authority, such as the German or 
Brazilian disciplinary au thority in the example above, decided to 
assert jurisdiction over a particular activity .s4 fn that instance) the 
German bar would not  apply Rule 8.5 and would more l i kely 
directly apply German ethical rules to activities before a German 
judge in a German court room, even if the activity was w1dertaken 
SJ As described in more detail below, attorneys may still be accountable for 
violations of foreign law under Rule 8.4. See infrn Section 3.1.2. Larger questions 
about how and when U.S. lawyers should be ethically permitted or required to 
violate foreign law are beyond the scope of this Article and will be taken up in a 
forthcoming companion article, The Glolml Advocate. 
s• The doctrine of double jeopardy only formally applies with respect to 
criminal proceedings within the United States. The fundamental concern 
underlying the doctrine-that an individual should not be subject to prosecution 
by multiple authorities for the same underlying conduct-has an exception when 
separate sovereigns are applying the sanctions. Sec United States v, Lanza, 260 
U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (applying the constitutional practice of double jeopardy). The 
<1ctivities of global advocates, almost by definibon, <1re subject to review by 
�-eparate sovereigns. Thus, while the doctrine does not formally apply, the sam.e 
underlying c:ono:'rn is present. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss4/21
2009] LA f!VYERS WITHO UT B ORDERS 1 061 
in connection with a U .S .  proceeding or " matter ."ss Apart from the 
fact that d isciplinary ac tion by foreign bars has not yet 
ma teri alized, U . S .  attorneys have other reasons to conform to 
foreign e thical rules, such as avoiding possible foreign criminal 
prosecution or possible risks to the success of the legal activity 
i tself.S6 This exercise o f  professional judgn1ent, which experienced 
global advocates i nevitably already undertake, is  currently 
obscu red and obviated by Rule 8.5. While U .S.  a ttorneys should be 
encouraged to consider and comply with foreign ethica l  rules, they 
a re instead ethically excu sed from even considering other 
potentially relevant ethical rules whenever they can claim the 
" cover" of an overarching U . S. " ma tter" that occasioned their 
overseas activities . Under this interpretation, even the advertisin g  
and direct solicitation b y  U .S. attorneys o f  Bhopa l  victims i n  
fla grant contravention o f  Indian ethical rules would presumably be 
defen sible to the extent those actions are permitted by U .S. ethical 
rul es .87 
3 . 1 . 2 .  Criminal Acts and Prejudice to the Ad1rz inis tra tion of 
Jus tice 
Even though Rule 8.5 appears to permit a U . S. a t torney to 
violate foreign law and professional conduct rules, that conclusion 
does not necessarily end the analysis.  Model Rule 8 .4 (b)  defines 
ss As noted above, regulatory authorities per se have not to date asserted 
such interest, though some nations have imposed sanctions through their criminal 
laws. See supra notes 46-47, and accompanying text. 
86 For exarnple, a German judge might not complete a judicially supervised 
deposition if it is learned that U.S. counsel was improperly speaking to the 
wih1ess. 
87 Some activities by attorneys in Bhopal, most particularly direct solicitation 
in the days after the disaster, appear to also violate U.S. ethical rules. See David T. 
Austern, Is Lawyer Solicitation of Bhopal Clients E thical ?, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 21, 1 985, 
at 16 ("One Washington, D.C., lawyer claimed to have signed contingency fee 
agreements with more than 7,000 plaintiffs within five working days of the gas 
leak - approximately one agreement every 60 seconds. " ) .  To the extent that the 
ambiguous reach of state bar jurisdiction at the time of the disaster prevented 
formal disciplinary action, Rule 8 .5 provides a welcome mechanism for 
monitoring and p rosecuting such abuses. The more delicate question is what 
consequences should flow from attorney advertising in India that is prohibited 
under Indian law, but permitted under U.S. ethical rules. Rule 8.5 would seem to 
suggest that, as long as advertising is undertaken in connection with a U.S. 
"matter," attorneys should not be concerned about being discip lined for violating 
Indian ethical rules. This outcome does not appear to be consistent with the spirit 
or intent of Rule 8.5.  
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" professional misconduct" to include the comm ission of "a 
crimina l act  that reflec ts adversely on the lawyer's honesty, 
trustworthiness or fi tness as a lawyer in other respects. " ss 
Meanvvhi l e, Rule 8 .4(  d) provi des that any " conduct that is 
prej udicial  to t he administration of justice" is also professional 
misconduc t .�>9 If  we asked the drafters of Rule 8.4 w he ther they 
intended the terms " criminal acts" and " the adrninis tra tion of 
justice" to include foreign law and systems, they would probably 
reject the notion .  Ru l e  8 .4, after all, was drafted when ethical 
regula tion, incl uding Rule 8 .5, was still limited to domestic 
practice.  The extension of Rule 8 .5 to transnati onal practice 
requires considera tion of w hether and how to apply these 
provisions beyond the U.S. system .  
I f  R ule 8.4 were n o t  interpreted to p reclude a ttorneys fron1 
violating foreign law, then Rule 8.5 would seem to ethical ly excuse 
violations of foreign Jaw and foreign ethical  rules when 
under taken in connec tio n  w ith a U.S. matter.9o Moreover, if these 
provisions of Rule 8.4 do not apply to foreign and international 
l aw, then U .S. ethical  rules raise i mportant questions about 
international judicial c om ity and attorneys' ethical  obl i gation to 
obey the law and con tribute to the rule of law. Rule 8.5 would 
transform a viol a tion of foreign law from an unintended mishap by 
an " accidental legal tourist"91 into conduct that is c onsidered 
S S  MODEL RULES OF PROF' L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b) (2002) . 
89 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4( d) (2002) . 
90 This interpretation finds an analogue in Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, which imposes reporting obligations on attorneys 'Whenever they have 
credible evidence of a "material violation of law."  15 U.S.C. § 7245. But " material 
violation" is defined to mean a violation of "applicable U.S. federal or state 
securities law . . .  [a] fiduciary duty arising under federal or s ta te sta tutory or 
common law, or a similar . . .  U.S. or state law. A violation of foreign law is not 
considered a 'material violation."' Stanley Keller, Implementing the S E C's S tandards 
of Professional Collduct for A ttonzeys, SP018 A.L. I .-A.B.A. CONTIN UING LEGAL EDUC. 
675 (2008). The complex issues of an attorney's obligations to obey international 
and foreign law are beyond the scope of this Article, and will be taken up instead 
in a future companion article, 17ze Global Advocate. 
91 Global advocates can be considered "accidental tourists" because, for the 
most part, U.S. law schools do not adequately prepare graduates to handle 
international and transnational cases. The internationalization of the U.S. law 
school curriculum is a relatively recent phenomenon. While there has been 
significant irmovation in this area, there remain doubts about how well U.S. law 
schools are preparing s tudents for international or global practice. See Carole 
Silver, Advmtu res in Comparn tive Legal S turiies: S tudying Singapore, 51 J. LEGAL 
EDuc. 75, 78 (2001 ) (" [D]espite the attention to internationalization and the 
increased presence of international and comparative courses in the curriculum, 
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ethically acceptable or at leasl irrelevant to U.S. regulatory 
aut horities. This outcome seems to do as rnuch harrn to the 
perceived i n tegrity of the U.S. lawyers as the underlying violations 
th.er11sel ves. 
Notwithstanding the an1biguities, it seen1s more l ikely thc:lt 
Rule 8.415 provisions extend, c1t least prima facie, to foreign law 
and foreign judkial systems. State regulatory authorities have 
appl ied Rule 8.4(b) to everything from driving under the influence 
of a lcohol, to acts of domestic violence, to willful failure to file an 
income tax form/ to .sexually inappropriate behavior, to drug 
posscssion.92 Com.mentators have suggested that the gravity of the 
offense is less important when i t  is related to the practice of  law.93 
Under this reasoning, it seems u n l ikely that global advocates' 
activities would be precluded from the purview of Rule 8.4 simply 
because they implicate foreign laws. After aU, their ability to 
operate outside the U.S. legal system is the primary skill that g1obal 
advocates market to their clients. Under this analysis, if Rule 8.4's 
provisions are extended to international and foreign law and 
foreign systems, then they appear to resurrect many of the conflicts 
that Rule 8.5 sought to put to resl. 
3.2. Public International Lmu Tribunals 
Rule 8.5(b)(1) is egua11y pernicious when applied to conduct 
connected to international tribunals as it  is when applied to 
international cases in national courts. Reference to "tribunals" was 
there remains doubt that suificient numbers of U.S. law students are enrolling in 
international and comparative law courses"). Law schools in most other countries 
make international law a mandatmy course. Sec Liliana Obregon, The Colluding 
Worlds of the Lawyer, the ScJwlar and the Polil.:ymaker: A View ujllllemational Law from 
Latin America, 23 WIS. INT'L L.J. 145, 150-51 & n.20 (2005) (comparing the role of 
international law in law school curricula in Latin America, Europe, and the 
United States). 
n See, e.g., People v. Meier, 954 P.2d 1068, 1071 (Colo. 1998) (concluding that 
"any practicing attorney would know" that asking a prospective and obviously 
vulnerable divorce client about the size of her breasts would "adversely reflect on 
the lawyer's fitness to practice law"); La·wyer Disciplinary Actions, ARK. LAW., 
Summer 2001, at 40 (2001) (attorney disban-ed for violation of 8.4(b) for conviction 
of two violations of Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act ("FACE Act")); 
Lawyer Disciplinary ActioHs, ARK. LAW., Summer 1997, at 37 (1997) ("use and 
possession of illegal drugs constituted "a criminal act that reflects adversely on [a] 
lawyer's . . .  fitness as a lawyer'' in violation of Model rule 8.4(b)''). 
93 See Thomas H. Moore, Cmz Prosecutors Lie? 17 GEO. ). LEGAL ETHICS 961, 
971-72 (200t1) (suggesting that various jurisdictions have approached this 1natter 
in different ways). 
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specifically intended to extenJ the Rule to non-judicial set tings, 
such as international arbitral tribunals.•,l-1 Obliging U.S. attorneys 
w ho appear before internaticn1al courts, international tribunals, or 
international cu:bitration triblmals to ad here to the n.:des of the place 
\\:here such tribunals "sit" virlually ensures that U.S. attorneys w i l l  
be bound bv rules that are different from tho�e anDlica ble tn � ll 
opposing counsel and wholly u n related to the proceedings 
themse lves. 
Consider, for exan1p le, what ef ect Rule 8.3 would have on 
proceedings before the International Court of Justice, vvhich sits i n  
The Hague. This location w a s  chosen because the Netherlands is a 
neutral jurisdiction and a faciLity was made avc1ilJble to the Court 
by the Carnegie Foundation, which owns and ctdministers tlle 
Peace Palace. No.ne of the members of the Tribunal are necessa rily 
Outch.95 Neither Dutch law, nor Dutch procedure, nor the Du tch 
bar, nor even the Dutch language has ;:my consistent relationship 
with, or even relevance to, proceedings before the Court.% Under 
Rule 8.5, hovvever, an Arnerican a ttorney appearing before the lCJ 
would be charged with understanding and abiding by Dutch 
ethical rules, which are written in Dutch (though also available in 
English)97 and designed to apply in Dutch domestic lega l 
proceedings. Moreover, thjs result is only half of the problem . 
Non-lawyer representatives are permitted to appear, but would 
'14 Ser supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
115 The CoLJJt is composed of fifteen jLtdges, who are elected for terms of office 
of nirte years by the United Nations General Assembly and the Security CounciL 
Altbottgh sonH� Dutch judges have served, it is neither required nor common for a 
srnall country like the Netherlands to have a judge on the court. Sec Statute of the 
lntemntional Court of Justice, Chapte1· I :  Organization of the Court art. 2-33, June 
20, 1945, 59 Stat 1062, 33 U.N.T.S. 993, avnilable at http:/ /www.icj-cij.org 
j docw11ents /index. php ?p 1=4&p2=2&p3=0#CHAPTER_1 (ex pia i ni ng that judges 
are elected by the General Assembly and by the Security Council from a list of 
persons nominated by the national groups in the Permanent Court of Arbitration). 
96 The official languages of the lCJ m:e English and French. Jd. art. 39. lt Is 
possible that, on occasion Dutch lawyers appear before the ICJ, just as Dutch 
jlldges may be appointed to it, though thei.r appearance is a matter of coincidence 
rather than part of an established or systemic relationship. Sec, e.g., Mark S. Ellis, 
The Evolution of D�feuse Counsel Appenring Befort! the lnter11.ationa/ Criminal Tribunal 
for the Fonuer Yugoslavia, 37 NEw ENG. L. REv. 949, 959 (2003) (describing the high­
profile trial of Ousko Tadic and hmv, "Professor Michail Wladimiroff, one of the 
Netherlands' most respected criminal lawyers was assigned as lead counsel for 
Mr. Tadic"). 
97 Netherlands Bar Ass'n, Legi�laf'ion, Rules and Regulo/it'IIS, ll'i'l1ila[lh: l1f 
http:/ 1 www.cldvocatenorde.nl/ english/legbhlthm/vademecu m.asp. 
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not be required to abide by Dutch ethical rules.9S Similarly, 
attorneys who are licensed in some jurisdiction other than the 
United States, where there is no Rule 8.5, would not be bound by 
Dutch ethical rules.99 
As this example demonstrates, application of Rule 8.5 to 
international tribunals has the pernicious effect of injecting a third, 
wholly unrelated set of ethical obligations into international 
proceedings, thus further splintering the existing ethical divide. 
Meanwhile, for all the reasons analyzed above, U.S. regulatory 
authority wil l  encounter considerable difficulty in i n terpreting 
Dutch ethical rules, or applying them in proceedings before the 
ICJ, where they were not intended to apply. 
3.3. International Arbitration 
As noted above, Rule 8.5 m.eans that U.S. attorneys appearing 
in an international arbitration are bound by the ethical rules of the 
jurisdiction in which the arbitral tribunal "sits." Even if the 
terminological problem of "sit" and "seat" is satisfactorily 
addressed through interpretation, there remain questions about 
whether it makes sense to bind attorneys, and as described below, 
arbitrators, by the ethical rules of the arbi tral seat, and whether 
national regulatory a uthorities are the institutions best suited to 
regulate professional conduct in international arbitration settings. 
The former set of questions wil l  be addressed i n  this Section, 
whereas the latter set of q uestions will be taken up in Section 4. 
3.3.1. Llnevening the Playing Field and Pre-Empting Client 
Prerogatives 
Some of  the oddities involved i n  applying the ethical rules of  
the seat of public international tribunals also apply to the 
international arbitration context and, at this point, it  is worth 
taking a closer look at some of their implications. One of the 
consequences of linking ethical regulation to the seat (or where a 
98 See Cesare P.R. Romano, The Americanization of International Litigation, 19 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 89, 115 (2003) (noting that the lCJ does not require party 
representatives to be licensed attorneys and referring to "the stateless community 
of public international law lawyers"). 
99 For example, the applicable CCBE rule is 1nore limited. See CCBE CODE OF 
CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY art. 4.1 (2006). ("A lawyer 
who appears, or takes part in a case, before a court or tribunal must comply with 
the rules of conduct applied before that court or tribunal.") 
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tribunal ''sits") is that it virtually guarantees that opposing counsel 
in the same proceeding will  be abiding by different rules since 
other regulatory authorities do not have si111ilar conflict of lavv 
rules. For exan1ple, in a proceeding sea ted in Texas betwee11 an 
American and a Mexican party, the U.S. attorney would be subject 
to strict U.S. rules regarding conflicts of interest, but the Nlexican 
attorney would not be. The Mc'<ican attorney instead would ]jkely 
operate under a presumed obligation (or a professional instinct)lllO 
to abide by Mexican conflict of interest rules. 
On the other hand, if the arbitration were seated i n  1Vlexico, 
under Rule 8.5 Mexican conflict rules would apply to the U.S. 
Clitorney. Although not entirely clear frorn rny own research, i t  
appears that Mexican conflict of interest rules would permit  n1any 
types of representation that U.S. rules would deem. to be 
impermissibly con.flicted.101 As a result, a U.S. attorney appearing 
in an arbitration seated i n  Mexico would apparently be ' ' liberated'' 
from U.S. conflicts of interest arising from that representation, 
perhaps to the surprise of an unsuspecting client or former client. 
Under those rules, the U.S. attorney is apparently permitted to 
engage in representation that would be considered conflicted 
representation under U.S. rules, and would give rise to related 
concerns about protections of confidential information. The injury 
from the conflict and potential disclosures or misuse of confidential 
information will likely be borne by a U.S. client, even though that 
party likely entered the original representation with expectations 
that U.S. ethical rules would continue to protect its interests into 
the future and presumably never consented to the conflicted 
representation. 
3.3.2. Regulating Arb-itrators Below the Radar 
Buried in the third note of the Reporters' Explanation of Rule 
8.5 ("Note 3") is yet another extension of the Rule that so far seems 
to have been overlooked by attorneys and com.n.1entators. 
Specifically, Note 3 of the Reporter's Explanation provides that: 
iOO Even if Mexican ethical rules do not purport to apply directly in 
international arbitrations seated in Mexico, an attorney licensed there will 
generally comport her conduct to those standards by which she ordin.arily abides. 
101 For an analysis of why the United States has what are regarded as 
uniquely "persnickety" rules regarding attorney conflicts of interest, see 
Catherine A. Rogers, Regulating lnternntionnl Arbitrators: A Funclion.al Approach to 
Developing Stn��cltmis of Conduct, 41 s-1 AN. J. lNl' L L. 53, 63 (2005), 
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Lawyers who participate (n [arbitration and other methods 
of forn1ally adjudicating the rights of parties], whether os 
ilt.'lllmls or as party rt:'presentofiiJes, should be bound. by the 
Rules of Professional Conduct of the jurisdiction in which 
lhe tribunal sits or by the rules of the tribunal itself if they 
otherwise provide. 1o2 
Although this provision is not part of the actual text of the 
Rule, or even of the official Comme11ts, it s·uggests·a rather radical 
extension of Model Rute 8.5 to activities of attorneys when they act 
as arbitrators. 
This extension has two important i mplications, which are dealt 
wi th in  turn below. First, a t  a procedural level, Note 3 subjects 
a ttorneys' conduct when they act as arbitrators to oversight by the 
bar that  licensed them as attorneys. Second, at a substantive level 
Note 3 implies that the rules that will be applied to their activities 
as arbitrators are the same rules that apply to them when they act 
as attorneys. Bot}l of these assumptions are questionable, and raise 
significant concerns for international arbih·ation practice. 
The apparent rationale for Note 3 is that when a ttorneys act as 
arbitrators, they do not cease to be l icensed by the relevant 
regulatory authority, and they should therefore sti l l  be bound by 
its ethical obligations and subject to its disciplinary jurisdiction. 
There are some reasons for this linkage. Even ii acting as 
arbi trators, attorneys are argLtably providing a form of "legal 
services." Moreover, the ethical obligations of arbitrators and 
attorneys seem to bear at least a s uperficial resemblance to each 
other. A ttorneys must be free from conflicts of interest, just as 
arbitrators must be free from bias. Attorneys must conduct 
"conflict checks" before accepting representation, just as arbitrators 
have a "  duty to investigate" before accepting an appointment. 
Despite this superficial resemblance, however, the role of 
ad vocate is fLmda1nentally different from the role of arbitrator1 
even if both roles can be performed by the same person. As Carrie 
MenkeJ-Meadow points out, " [o]ur conventional rules of ethics are 
particularly inapposite when lawyers serve i n  quasi-judicial roles 
as arbitrators . . . . ''JOJ Attorney ethics were developed to guide and 
102 Reporter's Explanation, supra note 21, at 830 (emphasis added). 
1U3 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics a11d Professionalism i11 Non-Adversnrial 
Lawyering, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 153, 162 (1999); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 
The Lawyer as Co11sensus Builder: Ethics for a New Practice, 70 TENN. L. REV. 63, 71 
(2002) ("When the purpose of the lawyer's work is to facilitate an agreement that 
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regulate conduct of individuals acting as advocates on behalf of 
cJients. Applying them directly to other activibes can only lead to 
confusion. 1o4 Attorney ethical rules do not apply when attorneys 
serve in roles such as Little League u m pires, law school lecturers, 
governmental officials, and perhaps most tellingly, judges. 
Instead, there are specialized rules to regulale their activities in 
those roles, just as special rules have been developed Lo guide and 
regulate arbitrators. tns 
Even if it is agreed that the content of attorney ethical rules 
should not be superimposed over arbitrators' activLties, there is 
stil l  a separate question of whether regulatory authori ties may 
nevertheless be an appropriate regulatory body to enforce the rules 
that are applicable. Perhaps the most forceful argument in favor o f  
having regulatory authorities perform this function is that 
currently there is no regulatory body that purports to be able to 
regulate, or provide ethical oversight for, arbitrators. As one 
scholar has wryly noted, " barbers and taxidennists are subject to 
far greater regulation than larbitrators]."l06 When arbitral 
institutions and courts preside over challenges to arbitrators or (in 
the latter case) allegedly bias-tainted awards, they assess the effects 
of alleged misconduct and provide a remedy to potentially 
aggrieved parties.1°7 They do not, however, directly regulate the 
arbitrators themselves. The fact that arbitrators also generally 
is acceptable to all parties rather than to attempt to maximize the individual 
client's interest, conventional lawyer ethics rules have scant relevance.''). 
104 Nevertheless, some courts and commentators have unwisely atten1pted 
just that. See Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 1994) (tying an 
arbitrator's obligation to investigate possible conflicts of interest to her status and 
ethical obligations as an attorney); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., When AOR Is Ancillary 
to a Legal Practice, Law Firms Must Conjro11t Conflicts Issues, ALTERNATTVES TO THE 
HIGH COST OF LITIGATION, Dec 1994, at 147 ("Applying this rule lregarding 
conflicts of interest] to (mediation]1 a law firm engaging in ADR practice must 
observe the rules of ethics-particularly the rules concerning conflict of interest­
in the ADR work and the other practice, considering them as a single practice.''). 
105 See Catherine A. Rogers, The Ethics of T11ternntio?1al Arbitrators, in THE 
LEADING ARBITRATORS' GUJDE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Lawrence W. 
Newman & Richard D. Hill eds., 2008) (giving an overview of the "proliferation of 
specialized codes of ethics and rules intended to guide and govern arbitrators' 
conduct"). 
106 Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution and Public Civil fuslice, 47 UCLA L. l�EV. 949, 1013 (2000). 
107 However, review of arbitral awards is not only an indirect assessment of 
alleged axbitrator misconduct, but also a particularly unemic one. 
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enjoy immu ni ty fron1. civil  liability tor misconductiOB means that 
c1rbitrators pre insu lated frorn virtually a] ]  m.echanisms that 
formi d l y  regulate lawyers, other t han repu tational sanctions and 
reL:1ted market consequences. 1°'J 
Some might argue that this regula tory vacuum should be filled 
by national bar associations, even if  they are not upplying the same 
rules that apply to attorneys. This rationale is cle<:ul y what led to 
the development of the proposed Mode! Rule of Professional 
CC>licluct of the Lawyer as Third f"larty Neutral, l iO which if adopted 
would provide that specia l set (A rules. W.bjle this effort should 
c learly be a.pplauded as a useful developn1ent in regule�ting 
dcHnestic arbitrators, its utility in regulating intcnlational 
arbitrators remains du bious. This pojnt is il l ustrated by the fact 
that other don1estic efforts at regu lating <1rbitrators usually exempt 
in ternational arbitrators. J 1 1 
U n l i ke domestic arbitration, there are numerous, multi-cultural 
and overle1pping sources that may a ffect the nature of arbitral 
proceedings and hence the function and professional oblige�tions of 
international arbitrators. If natjonal regulatory authorities become 
the primary interpreters and enforcers of  these various sources, 
w� Arbitrators generally enJoy some it:vel of irnmunity from civil claims 
arising ftum their role as <tn arbitrator. The scope and extent of that immunity 
mBv vary between countries and arbitral institutions. See Susan 0. rranck, The 
Liai1ility uflnteruntional Arbitrators: A Cvntparntive Analysis and Proposal for Qualified 
fllllllUility, 20 N.Y.L. SOL ) . lNT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2000); 2 BORN, supm note 48, at 
'1652-61. 
W'l Clearly, the threats of professional embarrassment and negative publicity 
have an effect on arbitrator conduct. Most ethics commentators agree, however, 
that reputational sanctions, particularly in a rapidly growing field, are not 
sufficient to regulate professional conduct. Cf Larry E. Ribstein, Ethics Rules, 
Agency Cos1•s, and Law Finlt Slntcture, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1726-27 (1998) ("Though 
these rules may not give rise to civil liability, the threat of disciplinary action and 
the possibility that ethical rules may provide standards of conduct in liability 
actions give ample incentives for lawyers to adhere to etl1kal rules."). 
·1w The proposed Model Rule is a product of a joint undertaking by the 
Center fot Public Resources and tl•e Georgeto·wn University Law Center, which 
was drafted for adoption into the Model Rules for Professional Conduct. CPR­
GF.Ot�GETOWN COMM'N ON ETHICS AND STANDARDS IN ADR, MODEL RULE FOR T�E 
LAWYER AS TlllRD-PARTY NEUTR1\L (2002.), n<)ailnblc at http://www .cpradLorg 
/Portals/0/CPRGeorge-MocleiRule.pdf. 
J I I  Catherine A. Rogers, The Vvcatiu11 of flu: /utewntiona/ Arbitrator, 20 i\M. U.  
l:'-!T'L L.  REV. 957, 1014-15 (2005) (discussing various efforts to regulate domestic 
arbitrators and the problems of extending those regnh>tions to intcrnatione�l 
,;lrbi tra tors). 
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just as they are with attorneys, t n  the risk is that enforcernent efforts 
wi l l  lead to greater frCigmentation and incoherence instead of 
coherence and consensus, u nclenn ining the efficacy of 
international arbitration. 
4. RECCLAT!NC ATTORNEYS It TRANSNA"f'!ONAL DiSPUTE 
RESOLUTION 
The first Sections of this Article have exami ned challenges 
inherent in  regulating global advocates and the lin1itations of Rule 
8.5 and other current a t tempts. This final Section considers 
broader and more prescriptive questions of bow global advocates 
should be regulated. To thRt end, this Section chal lenges the basjc 
approach and underlying assumptions of Rule 8.5. I n  Section 4.1, I 
argue against an omnibus choice-of-law rule, such as Rule 8.5, in  
favor of rules that prescribe different choice-of-law solutions for 
different types of attorney conduct. Recognizing that limitations 
w i l l  exist even with n1ore refined choice-of-law provisions, Section 
4.2 emphasizes the need to leave room for a measure of at torney 
discretion in cases where violations of foreign law o r  ethical rules 
may be justified. l explain in Section 4.3 that conflict-of-laws 
stopgaps like Rule 8.5 cannot provide Cl final alterna tive because 
they leave open in1portant questions about how to define 
attorneys' ethical roles and obligations when they are detached 
from any particular legal system. Section 4.4 argues against 
application of national rules in proceedings before international 
tribunals and urges that such tribunals adopt their own ethical 
rules. Finally, in Section 4.5, with respect to enforcement, I argue 
that home licensing authorities axe not institutional l y  adept to 
enforce unfamiliar ethical rules applied to activities that occur i n  
far off and distant proceedings. I propose instead that these 
authorities work in cooperation with their foreign counterparts 
and international tribunals to effectuate discipline identified by 
those bodies under applicable rules. 
4. 1. Moving Beyond One-Size-Fits-All Analysis 
Conventionally, conflict-of-laws analysis seeks to identify a 
single legal rule that applies to specific conduct, based on an 
evaluation of the contacts of the actors involved and the cmnpeting 
interests of the relevant sovereigns whose territory is implicated in  
11� See sttpra Section 2.3.3. 
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those contacts.m To that end, con.flict-of-lcwvs analysis usually 
begins by classifying a specific factual situation under " the 
oppropria te legc: d ce�tegories and specific rules of la w. " 1 l-l Rule 8.5 
defies this analysis. Instead, the Rule replaces Cl specific factual 
situation or event vvith the broad ca tegory of " advocacy before a 
tribuna l.' ' 1 13 Rather than parse out individual rules, Rule 8.5 
prescribes substitution of an entire, rnonolilhic code of leg21l etl·lics 
that is determined by the physic(ll locaU011 where that tribunal is 
located. 
Apart from being anom.alous to trad i tional conflict-of-la\,VS 
analysis, this approach leads to disturbing resu l ts because not all 
ethical rules that would be subst ituted out by application of Rule 
8.5 are limited in their effect to the immediate proceedings . For 
cx.:�mple, as noted above, Dutch ethical rules would apply in a 
proceeding before the Iran-U.S. Cia ims Tribunat.n6 These rules 
would perm.il a U.S. attorney to engage i n  what would be 
considered conflicted representation before an arbitration seated in 
Mexico, even though the brunt of the confJjct would be borne by 
another client who is not party to the current proceedings or who 
entered the representation agreentent wi thout  understanding that 
the ethical protections existing at that time could be substituted 
out. Conversely, as noted above, the Rule also implicitly 
au thorizes continued violations of foreign ethical rules whenever 
they are coru1ected to a U.S. malter. Under Rule 8.5, therefore, 
attorney advertising in Bhopal and pre- testi mon ial communication 
with German deposition witnesses would st i l l  be permitted despite 
being unethical (and potentially illegal) in the host countries.n7 
In related areas, other conflict-of-laws regi1T1es have taken a 
more careful and constructive approach. For exa1nplej i n  the 
context of jud.icial procedures, conflict-of-laws analysis separates 
out individual procedural events and specific activities, each of 
wh.ich receives its own particularized analysis regarding which 
legal rules should be applied. Under this approach, the provision 
1n See, e.g., EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2.1 (4th ed. 2004); 
WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WlLLlAM L. REYNOLDS, Ui\fOERSTANDlNG CONFLICT OF LAWS 
1-3 (3d ed. 2002) . There are of cours8 other schools that diverge from this more 
conventional approach, arguing that choice of law should not be jurisdiction­
selecting. 
1P RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7 cmt. b (197'1 ) .  
1 15  MODEL RUu:.sOF PHOF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5 (2002). 
t to See suprn note 16 and accompanying text. 
n� Sec suprn note 83 and accompanying text_ 
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of notice, the exchange of ple<ld i.ngs, lhc Lrja.l itself, and - within 
trial proceedings - even burden of proof and questions of witness 
competence and uedibility, each receive their own separate 
analysis regarding which system's rules clpply . I I S  This 
individualized analysis is necessary because for each procedural 
stage, the factors relevant to selection of an ,� nDl icabl e  rule mav '--.... r .l .� 
have different weight, depending on the purpose of a particular 
rule and the interests a ffected by the activity.119 
This approach is not inevitable in  legal ethics, as denwnstrated 
by the U.K. corollary to Rule 8.5, the Solicitors Regulation 
Authority's ("SRA' s") Rule 15 regarding " overseas practice." 1::!0 Tn 
place of Rule 8.5's terse directive, SRA Rule 15 l.1as an extensive 
preface that explains how its various provisions apply. It  then 
slogs through the each of the rules in the Solicitor's Code of 
Conduct, ptoviding individualized guidance about the application 
of each to activity abroad. Notably, U.K. confidentiality and 
conflict of interest obligations continue to apply to activities 
abroad, but the U.K. prohibition again&l contingency fees does not 
apply to representation in foreign jurisd ictions. As a result, SRA 
Rule 15 ends up with much more salient results than Rule 8.5, 
particularly regard ing rules that protect clients and third parties 
who are not directly involved in the relevant " n1atter.1' As Rule 8.5 
liS See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF COl\!Fl...JCT OF LAWS §§ 123-139 (1971) 
(highlighting the variety of different issues that require choice-of-law 
determinCition ). 
IW Section 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws provides a good 
summary of the factors tbat are generally considered in  determining which rules 
shoLtld be considered to determine the applicable rule of law: 
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systerns, 
(b) the relevant policies of the forum, 
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests 
of those states in the determination of the particular issue, 
(J) the protection of justified expectations, 
(e) the basic policies w1derlying the particular field of Jaw, 
(f) certain ty, predictability and uniformity of result, and 
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. 
RESTAT[MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 {'J971). 
120 See SOLICfTOHS REGULATIOi\: AUniORITY [SR/\j CODE OF CONDUG R. '15 
(2007) (providing the rules regarding overseas practice, ranging from conflicts of 
laws to fee practices) . 
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is reconsidered, at  a minimum, Its application should be more 
carefully modulated and tailored to fit  specific �thical rules. 
4.1. Regulatory Arbitrngc and Profe�:;;ionnl Discrelion 
Another unpleasant side effect of Rule S.S's omnibus approach 
to conflict of laws is that it cornpletely obviates the need for 
attorneys to exercise any professional judgment or d iscretion in 
selecting applicable rules. Rule 8.5 in1plicitly authorizes attorneys 
to violate - with ethical impunity- foreign la\N (at least under one 
possible interpretation)t2 t  and ethical rules l22 They are granted 
this free pass to disregard foreign provisions without any 
obligation that they spend even e1 moment of professional 
reflection to assess the value of the activity to the case or the 
relative importance of the foreign law or ethical rule being 
violated. To be sure, attorneys may sometimes be justified in 
violating forej�, law, particularly ii the foreign law would 
significantly impede or prevent a just result in  a legal proceeding 
that is not exclusively subject to that nation's laws.123 While a 
violation can sometimes be justified, exercise of discretion is 
necessary to determine its propriety in an individual case. 
Notably, both SRA Rule 15 and Rule 2.4 of the CCBE use language 
that suggests that attorneys can and should engage in some 
evaluative process.124 
n1 See supra Section 3.1 .2. (suggesting that one interpretation of Rule 8.5 
would ethically excuse violations of ioreign law and foreign ethical rules when 
undertaken in connection with a U.S. matter, and noting the harmful effects on 
U.S. attorneys' perceived integrity). 
m As noted above, this is because in any U.S. matter, U.S. ethical rules would 
apply. This interpretation assumes that other ethical rules, such as Rule 8.4, do 
not separately impose an obligation to abide by foreign law or ethical rules. For a 
discussion of Rule 8.4, see Section 3.1.2. 
m Cf Telenor Mobile Commc'ns AS v. Storm LLC, 524 F. Supp. 2d 332 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (reasoning that jt was far from clear that New York had a public 
policy against compelling individuals to violate foreign law, in this case a foreign 
injunction against enforcing an arbitration award). The extent to which attorneys 
can or should be able to violate foreign law is beyond the scope of this Article and 
will be taken up in  a future article, The Globnl Advocate. 
nq Specifically, Article 2.4 of the CCBE, entitled ''Respect for the Rules of 
Other Bars and Law Societies," provides: 
When practising cross-border, a lawyer fron1 another Member State may 
be bow1d to comply with the professional rules of the Host Member 
State. lawyers have a duty lo inform themselves as to the rules which 
will affect them in the performance of any particular activity. Member 
organisations of the CCBE are obliged to deposit their codes of conduct 
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Another failing of the onu1ibus approach o f  Rule 8.5 is that in 
cases like the Blwpal d isaster, Ind ian lavv and ethical rules 
prohibiting a dvertising or solicita tion could be, and arguably 
should be applied, despite the fact that the adjud ication is located 
in New York. Similarly, putting aside for the moment ambiguities 
about the definition of " matter" described above, Gennan ethical 
rules prohibiting pre-testimonial communication could apply to a 
deposition being taken in Berlin for use in a case pending in 
California . Rule 8.5 would apply to make the same body of ethical 
rules apply to all these areas, in apparent disregard of Indian and 
German interests. 1 25 Such an indiscriminate a p proach is not 
necessary. 
SRA Rule 15, in contrast to Rule 8.5, incl u des a provision to 
allow sol icitors to comply with local law. Specifically, it provides 
that " if compliance with any provision of these rules would result 
in your breaching local l aw, you may disregard that provision to 
the extent necessary to comply with that local law . " 126 This rule 
does more than simply rej ect Rule 8.5' s tacit approval of violations 
of foreign ethics and law. By using the word " may," SRA Rule 15 
appears to permit a ttorney d iscretion in resolving conflicts 
between the SRA Code of Conduct and foreign local  law . In a 
similar vein, though in a d ifferent fran1ework, Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 4 permits, under certain circumstances, service of 
process in violation of foreign l aw, but only after a judge has 
evaluated whether such action is justified.127 Judicial supervision 
over intentional violations of forei gn laws or ethical  rules may be 
an alternative way to ensure that such violations are duly 
considered and justified .  
at  the Secretariat of  the CCBE so  that any lawyer can get ho ld  of the copy 
of the current code from the Secretariat. 
CCBE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, art. 2.4 
(2006) . 
125 Notably, India, Germany and other countries are sti l l  able to prohibit 
these activities and prosecute attorneys who are caught violating these 
prohibitions. Within national systems, however, violations of law and rules, 
particularly those related to law practice and the integrity of the justice system, 
are usually also regarded as ethical violations as provided in Rule 8.4. 
126 SRA CODE OF CONDUCT R. 15.01 (2)(c) (2007). 
127 Those circumstances, most notably, include an order from a Federal 
District Court judge directing such service. See FED. R. C!v. P. 4(f) (3) (stating that 
service may be effected in a place not within any judicial district of the United 
States by other means not prohibited by international agreement as may be 
directed by the court) . 
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f n  deter.min i n.g whether violation of a foreign rule is justified, 
one of the most importa nt considerations under traditional 
conflict-of-laws analysis wou ld be whether the tvvo rules are 
si mply i nconsistent or whether th�y directly conflict. Conflicting 
rules exist when the rule from one systent requires what the other 
system forbids, ra is ing problems tha t are distinct from those raised 
by rules that aTe merely inconsistent. The problem here is that zm 
attorney is compelled by one system to do something that another 
system prohibits. The conflict, in other words, creates an 
1nescapable double deontology problen1 that entails an 
Lmavoidable risk of professional discipline, though not necessarily 
in lhe attorney's home jLuisdiction. By way of a concrete example, 
consider a letter by a French attorney to a U.S. attorney that is 
marked confidential, but explains the conditions under which her 
client would agree to settle. Under French ethical rules, an 
Clttorney receiving such a conul1tmication would be prohibited 
frOJJl sharing the letter with her client, but under the U.S. ethical 
ru les, a receiving attorney would be required to conununicate the 
letter to her client because .it contains a settlen1ent offer.12s It is 
impossible for the attorney to comply with both rules because they 
directly conflict. In that instance, allowing or even requiring the 
attorney to violate the foreign ethical rule can arguably be justified. 
With rules that are mere.ly inconsistent, where there is no direct 
conflict, permitting violations of foreign rules or law may be Jess 
justifiable. Witb inconsistent rules, one system permits (but does 
not require) what the other system prohibits. In that situation, the 
attorney is not facing a Catch-22, but rather a potentially strategic 
opportunity for regulatory arbitrage. Given a choice, the attorney 
would typically prefer the rule that permits, or even requires, 
conduct that is most advanta geous for the client. For example, i n  a 
deposition in Germany for a U.S. litigation, the U.S. a ttorney 
would likely prefer t o  abide by U.S. rules that permit pre­
testimonial communications, particularly if the other side's counsel 
were bound by the German prohibitions against such prohibitions 
and the judge did not find out. fn its current form, Rule 8.5 could 
be read as relieving the U.S. attorney from any obligation to even 
consider whether such pre-testimonial communication violates 
German law or represents an affront to a German sense of 
ns See MODEL RULES OF PROP'L CONDUCT R 1.4 & cmt. (2002) (establishing the 
U.S. requirernent for client participation in the 1·eceipt of any and all settlement 
c.omJnunications). 
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procedural fairness. But with lhis and other examples o£ 
inconsistent rules, an attorney could comply with both rules at the 
same time. Accordingly, i t  is not clear why, in the absence of son1e 
compelling circumstance, violation of a foreLgn rule should be 
countenanced under R u le 8.5. To the extent that a violation of 
foreign ethical rules or law can be justified, the process of 
justification should regLtirc the exercise of discretion, or as 
suggested above, judicial  oversight, to evaluate the need for a 
particular procedure against other factors, such as the i nterests of 
the State whose laws or rules wil l  be violated. 
4.3. Ethics in [nternaliollal ProccediHgs 
The quandary underlying the ethics of attorneys who appear 
before international tribunzds is not so rnuch abo u t  double 
deontology or finding which set of national r ules should govern. 
Instead, it is about matching the ethical rules to the attorney's 
particularized role in that context, and freeing her from otherwise 
conflicting national rules. 
International tribunals alter the roles of the advocates who 
appear before them.129 I n  perfonning these ne-vv roles, the national 
ethical rules of those attorneys may become obsolete, if not 
inapposite.no The pull of national ethical obligations remains 
strong, however, because the attorneys arrive with preconceived 
notions of their role that were shaped through an amalgam of 
elements from their national systems.131 Meanwhile, many of the 
formants that shape attorneys' national conceptions of their role 
simply do not exist, or do not exist to the same extent i n  
international contexts. 
129 See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 15, at 407 ("[T]he interreJational functional 
roles of actors in the international arbitration system . . .  are assigned by the 
procedural anangements of international arbitration and . . . reflect the 
underlying cultural values of the international arbitration system."). 
130 See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternafive Dispute 
Resolution: New Issues, No Answers fmm the Adversary Co11ception of Lawyers' 
Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 407 (1997) (providing an overview on the 
difficulties of applying the ethics rules meant to govern lawyers in adversarial 
contests in the alternative dispute resolution context). 
131 Cf Judith A McMorrow, Creating Norms of Attorney Conduct in 
International Tribunals: A Case Study of the lCTY, 30 B.C. 11\ff'L & CoMP. L. REV. 139, 
146 (2007) (describing how legal education, malpractice standards, market and 
informal social controls, and applicable mechanisms of self-regulation shape the 
ethical obligations of attorneys jn. domestic contexts). 
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As described C'lbove, i n ternationf!l tribunals are detached from 
any one nationa.l legal system. As a resu l t, these tribunals do not 
have thdr own cultural traditions cmd established malpractice 
standards in the same sense that these features exist i n  national 
systems. They have procedu res and customary practices, b u t  these 
procedures are n1uch newer (and in most cases less developed) 
than equIvalent proced Lu·es in national cou rts.m For these reasons, 
some commentalors have argued that in ternational tribunals do 
not need (or cannol have) t.hcir own ethicwl ru les, but should 
inste8d rely on choice-o£-la w principles to determine which 
national ethical rules should apply. t :>3 vVhile a conflict-of-laws 
approach has the appeal of tapping into well-established and 
institutionally grmmded rules, national legal ethics cannot provide 
mecmingful guidance when tlle essential mle of an advocate has 
cbanged becaLLSe they are operating i n  a significantly different 
procedural and cultural context. Instead, what  is needed for 
attorneys to fully appreciate and function in their new role is 
retraining or re-acculturation into lhe relevant in ternational 
system, and pertinent ethical ru-les to guide and facilitate that 
process. 
Son1e international tribunals have developed their own ethical 
rules tJu·ough a combination of pragmatism C�nd re-accul turation. 
Practice before international tribunals is a distinctive " blend of 
international and domestic concepts and procedures, req uiring 
w1ique skills, experience, knowledge, strategic sense and training . 
. . . ''n� Since national legal trainin.g does not generally prepare 
attorneys for practice before in ternational tribunals,ns professional 
t31 This observation is most true with respect to certain so-called public 
international law tribunals, but less true with respect to international arbitration, 
which is often touted as contributing to the development of international 
procedures. See John R. Crook, Fnct-Findi11g in the Fog: Determi11ing the Facts of 
Uphenuals and Wars in Ilzter-Stnte Disputes, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION 313 (Catherine A_ Rogers & Roger P. Alford eds., 2009). 
B::l See e.g., Kirsten Weisenberger, Peace is Not the Abse11ce of Conflict: A 
Response to Professor Rogers's Article 'Fit Aud Function ln Legal Ethics,' 25 WIS. lNT'L 
L]. 89 (2007) (arguing that extant rules of conducts are adequate for the purpose 
of regulating international arbitrations, and a conflicts of laws approach is the best 
option). 
134 Rich<Hd ] . Wibon, Assigned Defe;rse Counsel i11 Domestic nnd ln tenwtio11nl 
Wnr Crimes Tribunals: The Need .for n Strucfurul Appronch, 2 INT'L CRIM. L REV. 145, 
147 (2002). 
ns This is less true today with the prolileration of international moot court 
competitions to accompany the proliferation of intemational tribuna ls themselves. 
While the Jessup Moot is the oldest moot, the new investment arbitration, and the 
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competence often requires re-a.ccul t u ration and re-training that 
reshape an attorney's perception of their role as Gl domestic 
attorney into their distinct role as C1 global advocate. 
One of the most prominent examples of re-accul turation and its 
relation to ethical norms is  the ICTY. The ICTY is  made of twenty­
five judges fron1 twenty-three d ifferent countries and " [ t ] he 
defense bar of the JCTY has 257 members, drawn from multiple 
legal traditions, with roughly half of the defense bar from lhe 
former Yugoslavia . . . . '' Dr, As port of their participation in ICTY 
proceedi.ngs, attorneys are explicitly re-trained and cul turally re­
orientated in  order to develop professional and social norms that 
are essential to perforn1ing the role assigned to them by the ICTY. 
As 1:1 shorthand, this retra ining can be summarized as taking 
" lc ] ivi l  and common law lawyers" and reorienting them to the 
"new hybrid trial model [of the [CTY] and their role within that 
model.''137 A l l  attorneys at the ICTY nndergo this re-orientation. T t  
has been particularly important, however, with respect to Soviet­
era trained lawyers, who viewed the ro]e of the criminal defense 
lawyer as an enemy of the state.'1 3S 
Once the role of a ttorneys before the ICTY was established, 
new ethical norms appropriate to the new role were developed and 
International Criminal Court Moot also offer students opportunities not only to 
address international arguments undet' international procedures, but also to argue 
ngainst law students from other countries. For example, the Vis International 
Arbitration Moot draws over 200 teams from around the world to Viem1a, and 
sixty-five teams to Hong Kong for the Vis East. See Fifteenth Ammal Willen1 C. 
Vis International Comn1eTcial Arbitration Moot 2007-2008 Registered Teams, 
http:/ jwww.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/ntoot/particip<mtsl5.html (last visited Apr. 
lO, 2009); Sixth Annual Willem C. Vis International Commercial Arbitration 
Moot (East) 2008-2009 Registered Teams, http:/ I wwvv .cisgmoot.org 
/ ParticipatingTeams.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). " [P]articipation in the annual 
Willem C. Vis lnternational Con1mercial Arbitration Moot Court as a student is a 
way of 'marking' oneself to the seasoned members of international conunercial 
arbitration as destined for greatness in the field." Benjamin G. Davis, The Color 
U11e in International Commercial Arbitration: A n  American Perspeclive, 14 AM. REV. 
[NT'l. ARB. 461, 516 (2003); see a/so THE VtS BOOK: A PART!Cli'ANlS GUIDE TO THE 
WILLEM C. VTS INTERNATfONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION MOOT (Janet Walker ed., 
2008) (demonstrating that international moot court experiences have become so 
popular as to support a commercially available guide for participants). 
136 McMorrow, suprn note 131, at 148. 
1)7 !d. 
ns Mark S. Ellis, supm note 96, at 957 (2003) ("Many of the 'qualified' non­
western attorneys were trained in the communist/ socialist era, in a system that is 
antithetical to the Tribunal's substantive nnd procedural laws.''). 
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eventually codified .Bq All  this occurred despite the fact tha t 
" [t]here was no shared history, background, or cul ture to help 
detennine the best course of nclion . " t.w Despite this re­
accu l t u ration and related new ethical rules, a ttorneys at the TCTY 
sti l l  remain reluctant to er1gage in conduct thal violates their home 
ethical norms. The reason is that most national ethical rules do not 
provide guidance similar to Rule 8.5 so lhut a ttorneys are (or 
believe they are) still bound by Lheir home ethical rules when 
appearing before the ICTY. 1 � 1  
A similar process of j)rofessional socialization and re­
orientation has occurred in i n ternational arbitnHion. For example, 
when U.S. attorneys first began appearing in international 
arbi tration, they often engaged in systen1atic ex parte 
communications with their party-cippoinled arbitrators. This 
practice was considered acceptable in domestic U.S. arbitration142 
139 See id. at 966-68 (outlining the devehJpment of the ICTY Code o.f 
Professional Conduct). 
· 
1�0 Sec McMorrow, supra note 13"1, at 148. 
l n See id. at 142-43 (noting that the tension between home ;:�nd fCTY ethical 
rules is a Hevia ted In practice by providing two or more defense counsel who can 
assign tasks am.ong themselves based on their home jurisdiction rules); see also 
Ellis, supra note 96, at 959 (noting the strategic "pairing" of defense counsel). 
t-12 See, e.g., Lifecare Int'l, inc. v. CO Medicai, lnc., 68 F.3d 429 (11th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that an arbitration award, whicb vvas based on arbitrators' determination 
that parties had entered into binding settlement agreement even before agreement 
was reduced to writing/ was not "arbitrary and capricious."); Sun kist Soft Drinks, 
Inc. v. Sul'lkist Growers, Inc./ 10 F.3d 753, 760 {11th Cir. 1993) (finding no 
misconduct despite finding that party-arbitrator met with representatives and 
witnesses of appointing party before arbitration to plan strategy); Drexel 
Burnham Lambert lnc. v. Pyles, 701 F. Supp, 217, 220 (N.D. Ga. 1988) ("The 
appearance of impropriety alone i s  insufficient; a party seeking to vacate the 
award must establish facts that create a reasonable impression of partiality,"). 
These cases involved domestic U.S. arbitrations, which rneC\ns that these 
objections did not arise because of conflicting cullu.ra] perspectives on ex parte 
communication. H should be noted that even in the United States, these practices 
have met with significant criticism. See, e.g.,. james H. Carter, lmproving Life with 
the Party-Appointed Arbitrator: Clenrer Conduct Guidelillesfor "No11 Neutrals," 11 AM. 
REV. INT'L ARB. 295 (2000) (discussing non-neutral party-appointed arbitrators vis­
a-vis neutral party-appointed arbitrators); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in 
Arbitratio11 nnd Related Dispute Resolution: Wlznt's Hnppenhzg and Wlwt's Not, 56 U 
Miami L. Rev. 949 (2002) (reviewing the ethical issues in arbitration); Andreas F. 
Lowen.feld, Tlze Pnrty Appointed Ar/Jitrntor in lnlernatiollal ContrClversies: Some 
Reflectiorls, 30 TEX. INT'L L. J. 59, 60 (1995) (noting that such partisanship among 
arbitrators is not the norm in intern11tional arbitration). Recently, i n  response to 
this problem, some institutions have clarified their arbitr<ll rules to reflect that all 
arbitrators are expected to etct as "neutrals." See, e.g., LONDON CT. INT'L 
AI�BITRATION ARBITRAL R . . art. 5.2 (11 Ali arbitrators conducting an arbitration under 
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and in some other cm1ntries, but rather abhorrent i n  international 
arbitration practice generally, which deems pcrn1issible only 
l imited comn1Lmication on procedural matters.H3 Through a 
process of social re-orientation within the arbitxation community ,  
an ethical norm against most forms of ex parte comnmnication has 
emerged. This norn1 is followed in rnost cases and is now 
incorporated into various arbih·al rules and codes of ethics.L4..J 
In another exa1T1ple, th.cre was a notable gap i n  perceptions and 
practices about extensive pre-testimonial prepara tion of witr1esses 
in international arbitration, as with the .ICTY_1.t5 Skepticism about 
pre-testimonial conu11wl.icalion is n1ost pronounced among 
lawyers from civil law traditions. For example, Gern1an attorneys 
cue generally prohibited from engagjng in pre-testimonial 
communications with witnesses in German judicial proceedings. 
German attorneys in i nternational arbitration practice, however, 
have professionally re-oriented and developed a new norm of 
these Rules shall be and remain at all times impartial and independent of the 
p.:nties; and none shall act in lhe arbitration as advocates for any party."). 
14:< See lNT'L BAR ASS'N [JBA] R. Of' ETl:-I ICS FOR [NT'L ARB! rRt\TORS, art. 5.3 
(stating arbitrators should avoid "nny unilateral communications regarding the 
case" and to inform the other p<�rty of its substance if it  occurs), For extended 
discussion of ex parte conu1mnication in international arbitration, see W. 
LAURENCF. Ci�AIG, WJLLJAM W. PARK, & J,'\N PAULSSON, lNTERNATJONAI. CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE ARBITRATION § 13.07 (2d ed. 1990); M. Scott Donahey, The lmtependenc:c 
and Neutrality of Arbitrators, 9 J. TNT'L ARB. 31, 41-42 (1992). 
14-1 AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N [AAA)/ ABA CODE OF ETHICS FOR 
ARBITRATORS IN COivL\IIERCIAL DISPUTES Canons Ill(B)(1) (penTiitting ex parte 
communications with any rnernber of the arbitral tribnnal concerning such 
matters as setting the time and place of hearings or making other arrangements 
for the conduct of the proceedings)i Jd. Canon liJ(B)(l)(b) (permitting ex parte 
conununica6ons by party-appointed arbitrators as long as general disclosure is 
made); ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF TNTET<NATIONAL 
CoMtvJt.RCJAL ARBITRATION 225-26 (1991) (noting that "it is not unusual for there to 
be discussions with just one of the parties in respect of procedural matters such as 
availability for future hearings"). 
1-!5 See Nicolas C. Ulmer, Etlzics and Ef ectiveness: Doing Well by Doing Good, in 
THE COMMERCIAL WAY TO }UST!CE: THE 1996 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
CHARTERED lNSTITUTE OF ARBITRATORS 167, 171 & n.8 (Geoffrey M. Beresford 
Hartnell eel., 1996) (noting that i t  is not an unconunon practice for one arbitrator to 
communicate with the appointing party); Ambassador Malcolm� Wilkey, Tlze 
Practicalities of Cross-Cultuml Arbitration, i11 CONFLJCTING LEGAL CULTURES IN 
COMMERCIAL ARBLTRA TION: OLD IssUES AND NEW TRENDS 79, 86 (Steian N. Fromme! 
& Barry A. K. Rider eds., 1999) ("Contacts ex parte after all arbitrators have been 
selected and assumed their duties should be forbidden. But sometimes they are 
not."), 
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professional conduct that treats such comrnunications as ethically 
permissible in the internnt.ional arbitration context.t-16 
These developments signal that professional  norms for 
inletTta tional tribuna]s arc not only possible, b u t  also critically 
important to the fetir and effident functioning of proceedings. In 
the absence of forrnal ly  developed and codified codes, such norms 
are emerging on an info rma l and ad hoc basis. While this appears 
to be a positive development, i t  is not withoul problems. 
Attorneys' home ethical ru les continue to cast a "shadow" that "is 
omnipresent for the IZt wyers and judges,''1 17  in part becatlSC the 
prevalence of international rules over national rules is not well 
understood. 
While these ethical ''improvisations" may provide an essential 
stopgap before formal international ethical rules are cod iJied, they 
also have some serious drawbacks. wrost importantly, they can 
mask continued or new d i v isions, and they can evade established 
enforcement mechanism.s. For example, the new, unwritten ethical 
norm pennitting Germc-m a ttorneys to engage in pre-testimonial 
comnumication in international arbitration does not prescribe any 
limitations on this new enterprise, and i t  has not been formally 
acknowledged or regulated by Gerrnan bar au thorities. 
Without cu1y express new rule to substitute for the rule that has 
been displaced, the German attorney arguably has more latitude 
than the American attorney in pre-testimonial communications. 
An American attorney is still bound by U.S. ethical rules that 
establish the limits of proper witness preparation,l4S even if  those 
limits can be " permeated by ethical uncertainty.'' 149 Those U.S. 
ethical Hmita tions, however, may not be obvious. A German 
l a wyer, originally shocked by pre-testimonial conu11tmications, 
14o Sec Bernardo M. Cremades, Overco111ing tl1e Clnsli of Legal Cultures: The Role 
of Interactive Arbitration, in CONFUCf!NG LEGAL CULTURES, suprn note 145, at 147 
(suggesting that arbitrators must distingLtish the cultural background of part ies in 
order to effectively preside over proceed ings to which parties come with differing 
approaches to pre-testimonial communication with witnesses); Lucy Reed & 
Jonathan Sutcliffe, T!Je "Al/lericnllization" of InternntiOillll Arb it mtion ?, 16 lNT'L ARB. 
REP. 37, 42 (2001) (suggesting that while some consensus has emerged about the 
possibility of preliminary commtUlication with witnesses, there ret'nains conflict 
as to the extent permitted). 
147 McMorrow, S/1]11'11 note 131, at 142. 
1.JS See Bennet t  L. Gershman, Witness Cotlclling by Prosecutors, 23 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 829 (2002) (providing an overview of witness prepara tion in the United 
States). 
1�9 john S. Applegate, lt\lili iCSS Preparation, 68 TEX. L. REV. 277, 28l (1 989). 
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might reasonably infer that U.S. attorneys operate with no l i m its 
whatsoever in p re-testim.onial communications. 
This clSSLltTtption would find considerable reinforcernent i n  
popular portrayals of U.S. attorneys. For example, i n  the 1958 fi l m  
Anato111y of 11 i\l[u rder, a congenial but cynical defensl! attorney 
played by Jimrny Stewart describes the legal defense to m. urder to 
his client in :;uch a way that his client is jnspired to " recall" the 
facts consistent with that defense.l �u While it n1akes for good 
ciJ1ema/ t21lking to "a w i tness Rbout the law or about desired 
testimony before seeking the witness' own version of events comes 
dangerously neM [criminal] subornalion of perjury/'l51 and is  
generally considered a Lransgression of  U.S. ethical rules.152 The 
German altorneyr hovvever, has no reason to know about these 
l imitations and no obligation to abide by them. As a result, even 
with this ethical innovation designed to level the playing field, 
attorneys in the same proceedings may still operate under different 
rules. Making matters worse, these clashes may be even more 
concealed and nwre difficult to discover than when the differences 
were between fonnal, express and written rules. Finally, these 
newj unwritten rules are, by design, outside of formal national 
enforcement regimes. This escape hatch raises separate and 
important questions about who should enforce applicable ethical 
rules, which is the topic of the next Section. 
Rule 8..5, and arguably also Article 2.4 of the CCBE Coder 
acknowledge the i mportance of international tribunals having their 
own ethical rules that trump otherwise applicable national ethical 
rules. These concessions, however, have had l i mited value because 
to date few in ternational tribunals have actually enacted codes of 
ethics for the lawyers who practice before them. Tn the meantime/ 
the tug of national ethical rules has collided with the very practical 
need for international ethical rules. 
ISO For a critique of Jimmy Stewart's technique, see Richard H. Underwood, 
Pe�;ury! Tire Chnrges nnd tire DejeHses, 36 DuQ. L. REV. 715, 781-82 (1998). 
151 CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETt TICS § 12.4.3 (1986). 
152 See Peter A. joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Witness Preparation: Wlzm Does 1t 
Cross The Line? 17 CRIM. Jusr. 48, 49 (2002) ("At the same time that the lawyer is 
required to thoroughly 1nvestigate and persuasively present the facts on behalf oi 
his or her dient, both the criminal law (md ethical rules prohibit the lawyer from 
presenting false t�stirnony."). 
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4.4. W/1o 5/wuld Regulate Glolml Advoc111'e� ?1:13 
l 083 
The assumption underlying Ru lc 8.5 is that, wherever in  the 
world a global advocate open1 tes and wha tever rules apply, the bar 
association that originally licensed the attorney should be the 
primary, if not sole, au thority that reg·ula tes her. This conclusion is 
based on two assllmptions. The first asswnption is that the bar 
association Lhot has licensed the attorney has the greatest stake in 
ensuring the attorney's professional conduct. The licensjng 
association cle21rly has a d i rect interest in enforcing the rules it has 
promulg21ted and upholding the i n tegrity of t hose professionclls i t  
has licensed. The force o f  these in terests, however, may be 
dim inished when the misconduct occurred overseas and in  
violation of  foreign ethicc1l rules t=u1d foreign law. A second 
assumption is that only the licensing bar has the power to i mpose 
professional sanctions, including disbarment. Particularly in  l ighl 
of some of the problems described above,'154 however, there are 
reasons to question whether national regulatory authorities are 
particularly compelent to perform this task. 
Apart from the conceptual difficulties in interpreting and 
applyi11g foreign ethical ru les, there are also practical and 
procedural problems. H.ow CCH1 local regulatory au thorities 
conduct disciplinary proceedings and factually assess whether 
misconduct is present when the relevant events occurred 
p hysically, culturally, and politically far away? While licensing 
authorities should not be excluded from regulating global 
advocates, this Section argues that they should not be the fronl line 
regulators. Instead, they should work in coordinated efforts with 
international and foreign tribunals to assess and enforce penalties 
for ethical transgressions that are identiiied and evaluated with 
foreign. and international tribunal and regulatory authorities. 
National regulatory authorities exist and operate in domestic 
political and legal contexts. This national orientation inevitably 
affects their ability to apply foreign or international ethical rules, 
whose content may be both difficult to discern and contr21ry to 
regulatory authoribes' own institutional sense of proper attorney 
conduct. For example, would U.S. disciplir1ary a uthorities be 
inclined to punish a U.S. a ttorney for "improperly" preparing a 
m This title is borrowed from David R Wil kins' seminal work: !Nl!o Siwulcl 
Rcgulnlt: Lawyers? Se!! Wilkins, supra note 9. 
15·1 See ;;uprn SecLion 2..3A. 
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witness when French ethical rules arc deemed to apply under R u le 
8.5, even though such conduct V':ouJd otherwise be ethically 
penTtissible or required under U.S. rules? Would U.S. a u thorities 
condemn a U.S. attorney for disclosing information to a client that 
was unequivocally valuable to that client, but which a foreign 
syslern required be maintained as "confidential"? Al ternatively, is 
it possible to imagine a french bar association disci p l i ning a 
French attorney for unethically withholding discoverable 
documents when no such offense exists in France and France has a 
historical tradition of being hostile to the very notion of 
discovery?135 
Regulatory a u tl1orities are not a l l-purpose macl1ines into which 
a set of ethica I rules CC\n be input  at one end and a disinterested 
disciplinary decision applying those rules is produced a t  the other 
end. Like the lawyers they adm.inister, the individuals who staff 
regulatory C1llthoril1es arc products of a local legal culture.156 Their 
legal history, background, and training necessarily color their 
perceptions about the propriety of atto.rney conduct and their 
interpretation of rules appl ied to such conduct.157 When filtered 
through national regulatory a u thorities, i nternational and foreign 
legal ethical rules wi l l  be refracted through these national 
perspectives. The am.biguities inherent in legal translation 
described above15s will  increase the potential for distortion. A 
similar phenomenon has already been observed as  substantive 
155 Fran,ce, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, Sweden, and 
Canada have all enacted blocking stGltutes that forbid their ci tizens from 
complying with certain U.S. discovery requests. See William S. Dodge, 
Extraterritorinlify nnd Conj7.icts-oj-Lmus Tlzenry: An Argument for fudicinl 
Unilaferlllism, 39 HARV. INT'L LJ. 101, 164 & n.357 (1998) ("The extraterritorial 
application of U.S. antitrust laws hus led a number of other countries to enact 
retaliatory legislation in the form of blocking and clawback statutes."). 
1so There are inten.1ationa 1 sections to state regulatory authorities, but they 
play no role in discipline. Their functions are limited to organizing research, 
networking opportunities, and symposia on issues of international law and 
practice. SRf\ CODEOP CONDUCT R 15 (2007). 
J57 Cf Wilkins, supm note 9, at SJ0-11 (noting that, since enlorcen'lent officials 
invariab1y exercise a certain amount of discretionary authority over the content of 
professional norms when they apply ethical rules in particular cases, "conferring 
enforcement authority is tantamount to empowering a particular set of actors to 
place their own interpretation on these m11biguous professional norms''). 
151< Sec supra Sectiun 2.3.4. 
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international and foreign law have been distorted w hen 
interpreted by national courts . l 59 
An equ ally i mportant, and ultimately related, i ssue is that any 
adjudicatory tribunal mt1 s t  ha ve the ability to sanction and control 
the behavior of attorneys appearing before them. The ability to 
apply rules i mplies the ability to develop and refine their content. 
Interna tional tribu nals and their rules of conduct cannot, as one 
comm.enta tor has su ggested, be held " captive to out-of-state 
disciplinary author1ties . " t60 The ICTY, which is the international 
tribunal that has most directly engaged issues of ethical conduct 
and regulation, has an establ ished record of assessing alleged 
misconduct by attorneys and issuing sanctions for contempt of 
court . Some tribu nals seem reticent to exercise any disciplinary 
role, while other tribunals, p articularly international arbitration 
tribunals, seem to doubt their own power to do so (or face legal 
impediments to doing so) . The power to resolve important 
international and transnational legal issues must be understood as 
being accompanied by a power to control and regu late the 
attorneys who participate in those proceedings.1 61 
5. CONCLUSION 
Many of the world's most urgent issues of transnational 
regulation are increasingly being funneled into international and 
transnational a djudications. These a djudications are brought and 
managed by a dvocates whose ties and commitments to any 
particular legal system are often p artial and tangential .  The 
response to resulting a mbiguities about what e thical rules apply to 
their conduct has primarily been a reliance on choice-of-law rules 
159 See Eyal Benvenisti, Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Applicntion of 
International Law: A n  Analysis of A ttitudes of National Courts, 4 EuR. J. INT' L L. 1 59, 
160-75 (1 993) (discussing reasons that prompt most national courts to approach 
international norms apprehensively and limit their application within national 
legal systems). 
160 Daly, supra note 2, at 778. Daly refers to domestic U.S. courts being held 
captive to the regulatory authorities of a different state, but the problem she 
identifies is equally applicable in the international context. 
161 This power may not be as acceptable in some other systems that do not 
give judicial officers a role in domestic contexts. For example, in France, 
professional regulations are enforced locally by the conseil de l 'ordre, which is the 
only organ that has the power to sanction members for violations of rules of 
conduct. See CHRJSTJNA DADOMO & SUSAN FARRAN, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTP.il 1 20 
(2d ed. 1 996) (" [The COI / Seil] has disciplinary powers and can sanction professional 
faults or infringements of rules of conduct." ) .  
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that designttte pnrticular national ethical rules. There is nn 
emerging realization, however, of the inadequacy of national 
ethical ru Jes, which were designed to apply to dmnestic practices 
i n  domestic procedural contexts, i n  regulating global advoc<Ky. 
l\lloreover, regulatory au thorities are l imited in their ability to 
apply foreign ethical rules or effectively evaluate conduct before 
foreign tribunals through conventional rnodes of regulation. 
The curn3nl ,·crsion of Rule 8.5 was an important mechanism 
for bringing these issues to light. Now, however, additional 
systernatic analysis is needed to provide more n1eaningfu 1 rules. 
Those rules musl be implemented not in isolation, b u t  through 
developed international networks and perhaps even eventua1lv an 
international regula tory body. 
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